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THE KULEANA ACT REVISITED: THE
SURVIVAL OF TRADITIONAL HAWAIIAN
COMMONER RIGHTS IN LAND
Maiv n Clech Lim*
AbstracL The issue of aboriginal land rights raises significant legal and moral questions.
The starting point for discussion of Native Hawaiian land rights is the Kuleana Act of
1850. This Act enabled Hawaiian commoners, for the first time in Hawaiian history, to
acquire fee simple title to land. The Act did not, however, contain provisions simultaneously terminating their traditional rights in land. What these traditional rights consist of,
and to whom they apply, remain relevant issues. The author examines the Act in the
context of its surrounding history, laws, and judicial interpretations, and concludes that
the Kuleana Act introduced a system of rights parallel to traditional Hawaiian land rights,
not in derogation of them. Consequently, the author argues, traditional land rights remain
available, uiider the law, to descendants of the commoners of 1850.
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INTRODUCTION 1

I.

In 1850, the Legislative Council of the sovereign and independent
nation of Hawai'i, which was ruled by King Kamehameha III, enacted
a statute, 2 popularly known as the Kuleana Act, 3 which granted the
common people4 fee simple title to their cultivated lands and house
lots, provided certain conditions were met. These were, in the main,
that claimants demonstrate to an appointed Board of Commissioners
to Quiet Land Titles ("Land Commission") that they in fact occupied
and had improved the claimed lands, be these in governmental,
Crown, or chiefly domains. 5
Until the passage of the Kuleana Act, the common people of
Hawai'i had held, to use Western parlance, undivided interests in the
land in common with the King and the chiefs.6 The first Constitution
1. A limited discussion of some of the issues raised in this article was presented earlier in
Lam, The Imposition of Anglo-American Land Tenure Law on Hawaiians, 23 J. LEGAL
PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 103 (1985). For a concise introduction to land tenure in Hawai'i,
see Kelly, Land Tenure In Hawaii,7 AMERASIA J., Fall/Winter 1980, at 57. For a cross-cultural
look at traditional land tenure systems in the Pacific, see LAND TENURE IN OCEANIA (H.
Lundsgaarde ed. 1974). For discussions of the modem relevance of land in Hawai'i, see G.
COOPER & G. DAws, LAND AND POWER IN HAWAII: THE DEMOCRATIC YEARS (1985); R.
HORWITZ & N. MELLER, LAND & POLITICS IN HAWAII (2d ed. 1963).

2. 2 REV. LAWS HAW. 2141 (1925). The full text of the law is reproduced in the Appendix.
3. The Act was so called because the lots awarded came to be known as "kuleana," a
Hawaiian term meaning "[r]ight, title, property, portion, responsibility, jurisdiction, authority,
interest, claim, ownership." M. PUKUI & S. ELBERT, HAWAIIAN DICTIONARY 165 (1971).

4. This Article uses "common people" and "commoners" to refer to all Hawaiians who were
not King, chiefs, or land agents. The Act itself uses the terms "native tenants," "natives," and
"people" interchangeably to refer to the same class of Hawaiians.
5. 2 REV. LAWS HAW. 2141 (1925).
6. L. THURSTON, THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF HAWAII 3 (1904). To say that land tenure

was "in common" is to force an Anglo-American legal construct on a uniquely Hawaiian social
reality. This problem of linguistic noncalibration, unfortunately, dogs any discussion of the
development of modem Hawaiian law. That Hawaiian law has been cast in largely Western
molds over the last 140 years may oblige students to talk in terms of Western legal constructs. It
should not, however, lure us into forgetting that a uniquely Hawaiian system of land-related
rights and obligations once prevailed which may be accurately understood only on its own terms,
linguistic and cultural.
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of Hawai'i, granted by Kamehameha III in 1840, described the traditional land system as follows:
Kamehameha I, was the founder of the kingdom, and to him belonged
all the land from one end of the Islands to the other, though it was not
his own private property. It belonged to the chiefs and people in common, of whom Kamehameha I was the head, and had the management
of the landed property.7
This traditional system suffered its first major legal onslaught in
18488 when, pursuant to discussions, the King, the chiefs, and their
land agents separated out their respective interests in the land.9 These
divisions came to be known as the Great Mahele.10 In it the King, and
the chiefs and land agents, who were collectively known as konohiki, 1
agreed, in separate bilateral compacts, to accept certain allotted areas
of the kingdom as their own while quitclaiming all interests in the
others' assigned portions. 12 These agreements were recorded in a volume called the Mahele Book. 13
The King,14 and by degrees the konohiki, 15 then conveyed or commuted to the government a portion of the lands they thus acquired.6
In this manner the government of Hawai'i became, like the King and
the chiefs, an allodial landholding party. Although each of these three
sets of landowners now held land independently of one another, their
holdings remained subject to the rights of native tenants living
7. Id.
8. The real onslaught on the traditional land tenure system came earlier. A Western market
economy was already developing before 1848. Unlike the traditional Hawaiian subsistence and
exchange economy, the Western system required that factors of production, including land, be
readily alienable. Land held in common obviously lacked this quality. For this reason,
Westerners clamored very early on for laws that would confer individual ownership of land. See
R. KuYKENDALL, THE HAWAIIAN KINGDOM 1778-1854, at 273 (1980). For a detailed
discussion of the impact of Westerners on traditional Hawaiian land tenure, see M. Kelly,
Changes in Land Tenure in Hawaii 1778-1850 (June 1956) (unpublished thesis available at the
University of Hawai'i Library).
9. See J. CHriNN, THE GREAT MAHELE: HAwAn'S LAND DIVISION OF 1848, at 15-16

(1958).
10. Id. at 20.
11. The term "konohiki" originally referred to a land agent appointed by a superior chief.
The term was later extended to include the chief himself. J. CHINEN, supra note 9, at 24 n.19.
12. I. at 16.
13. Id. at 20.
14. Ia at 25.
15. Id at 21-24.
16. Because all the lands "belonged" to the King, see supra text accompanying note 7,
whatever he yielded to the government was considered a gift. Id. at 26. The chiefs, on the other
hand, who initially "held" from the King, were required to pay a commutation to the
government, in cash or surrender of land, equal to one-third the value of the lands claimed. Id
at 21.
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thereon.17 This commingling of landholder and tenant interests in
land continued undisturbed until the passage of the Kuleana Act in
1850. The Act, in fact, constituted the government's response to the
complaints voiced by foreign residents, as well as ali'i or chiefs,18
against the continued commingling of landowner and tenant interests.
By its own terms, the new Act envisaged that, once fee simple titles
were awarded, "each man's land may be by itself." 19
Prominent members of the Hawaiian government evidently
expected that Hawaiian commoners would, without either hesitation
or hindrance, embrace the Western-derived entitlement to fee simple
ownership which was being extended to them for the first time under
the Kuleana Act. Chief Justice William L. Lee, who drafted the
Act, 20 for one assumed that commoners would readily lay claim to fee
simple awards of land. In describing the Kuleana Act to the Hawaiian
people, Lee said: "Two courses then are open for you. Either to secure
your lands, work on them and be happy, or to sit still, sell them and
die. Which do you choose? ' 21 The choice, as he portrayed it, was not
between getting or not getting fee simple title. The choice, instead,
hovered between tillage and sale after obtaining title. Another American member of the government, Richard Armstrong, published
remarks with similar assumptions. "Each man will be his own
Konohiki, ' '22 he declared. Following this, Armstrong set out, in earnest detail, the idyllic vision of a New England-style nuclear family,
rooted in sedentary agriculture, which now awaited the fortunate
Hawaiian commoner.23 Subsequent events, however, proved less than
fortunate for Hawaiians.
Standard estimates place the Hawaiian population of 1778, at Captain James Cook's arrival, at somewhere between 200,000 and
400,000.24 Seven decades later their descendants, who then numbered
about 80,500,25 received some 8200 fee simple awards under the Kuleana Act, representing title to less than one percent of the kingdom's
17. Id. at 29.
18. M. PUKUI & S. ELBERT, supra note 3, at 19.

19. 2 REV. LAWS HAW. 2142 (1925).
20. R. KUYKENDALL, supra note 8, at 291.
21. The Polynesian, Feb. 16, 1850, at 1, col. 5.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. M. Kelly, supra note 8, at 118. This figure has recently been challenged and dramatically
revised upwards to as much as 800,000. See D. STANNARD, BEFORE THE HORROR: THE
POPULATION OF HAWAI'I ON THE EVE OF WESTERN CONTACT 78-80 (1989).
25. R. SCHMITT, DEMOGRAPHIC STATISTICS OF HAWAII 1778-1965, at 72 (1968).
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land.26 This startlingly meager figure compels us to ask whether the
Act, in extending a fee simple regime to a few commoners, thereby
also extinguished the traditional rights which they and the rest of the
class had enjoyed in the land. The present Article, which examines
the Act, its historical context, and subsequent Hawai'i State Supreme
Court decisions, concludes that traditional commoner rights in land
were not abrogated by the Act, but remain essentially intact, and are
available to descendants of commoners today.
This conclusion clearly raises profound legal, political, economic,
and moral issues for Hawai'i. Nevertheless, the reading of Hawaiian
land rights presented here is not unprecedented, but parallels assertions of indigenous land rights established by mainland American
Indians in recent but already historic litigation.27 If traditional
Hawaiian land rights survived the passage of the Kuleana Act, as
research here shows they have, major adjustments in land title in
Hawai'i will be required, with obvious and serious consequences. That
consequences may be sweeping, however, is no reason to avoid a comprehensive and straightforward examination of the issues.
II.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The present section reviews the historical circumstances of the
Kuleana Act to see what may be learned of its intended purpose and
scope. Relevant to the review are, first, certain political and economic
features of traditional Hawaiian society; and second, the impact of the
West through the first half of the nineteenth century.
A.

Background

From 1778, when Captain James Cook first arrived in Hawai'i,28
until 1850, when the Kuleana Act was passed, Hawaiian society suffered a series of systemic shocks of an ideological, social, and, at times,
physical nature. These shocks characterized, everywhere in the
Pacific, the contact of island subsistence societies with Western
26. Levy, Native HawaiianLand Rights, 63 CAnIF. L. REv. 848, 856 (1975).
27. See County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226 (1985); United States v.
Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371 (1980); see also Note, County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation:
The Continuing Saga of American Indian TerritorialWars, 4 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 221 (1986).
28. W. SCHURZ, THE MANILA GALLEON 229 (1939). Spanish galleons sailed between
Mexico and Manila beginning in the 16th century. Id. at 193. While one or more of them may
have reached Hawai'i before 1778, the evidence is inconclusive. IdL at 228-29. Convention
continues to date Western contact to Cook's arrival in 1778. See R. KUYKENDALL, supra note 8,
at 3, 12-13.
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mercantilistic and capitalistic intruders.2 9 Rarely, however, even for
the Pacific, was the resulting devastation of native society as thorough
and speedy as in Hawai'i. For example, in 1819, a mere forty years
after Cook's visit and before the first missionary ever set foot on
Hawaiian soil, the Hawaiian government, on its own initiative, formally repudiated the old religion-gods, taboos, and all. 30 Such a sudden, explicit, and radical denial of a belief system, and hence of the
social order which the system underpinned, is rare in the annals of
societies. Its occurrence attests to the extraordinary impact that Western civilization exerted on native Hawaiian culture.
Ideological disinheritance was, if anything, surpassed by the material losses accruing in later years. Figures tell a blunt story. By
1896-97, Westerners, who comprised 21% of the population,3 ' owned
57% of all taxable lands and paid 67% of the real estate tax in
Hawai'i. 32 At the same time, persons of Hawaiian ancestry, who made
up 36% of the population, 33 paid only 24% of the same tax. 34 The
loss of land paralleled the staggering loss of population. As already
stated, approximately 300,000 Hawaiians inhabited the islands in
1778; 3' by 1850 only 80,500 remained.3 6 This phenomenal decrease
resulted in part from the island population's utter lack of immunity to
the sicknesses brought by the foreigners, such as smallpox, measles,
and venereal disease. 37 In other part, however, population decline was
related to the alienation of the people from their land.3 8 Without land,
Hawaiians could not secure adequate material sustenance or maintain
stable social relationships, which in turn drastically affected their ability to live and their desire to reproduce.3 9
The process of alienation from the land is best understood by first
recalling the traditional nature of the Hawaiian polity and its land
29. For an overview of this Pacific-wide trauma, see D. OLIVER, THE PACIFIC ISLANDS

155-316 (rev. ed. 1962). For a Hawai'i-specific account, see D. STANNARD, supra note 24.
30. R. KUYKENDALL, supra note 8, at 65-70. In effect, the Hawaiian rulers, who were both
architects and devotees of the traditional religion at its state level, repudiated only the state
religion in 1819. Folk religion, in one form or another, continues to this day. See also
Davenport, The "HawaiianCultural Revolution" Some Political and Economic Considerations,
71 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 1 (1969).
31. A. LIND, HAWAII'S PEOPLE 34 (4th ed. 1980).
32. A. LIND, AN ISLAND COMMUNITY 57 (1938).

33. A. LIND, supra note 31, at 34.
34. A. LIND, supra note 32, at 57.
35. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
36. R. SCHMITT, supra note 25, at 72.
37. D. OLIVER, supra note 29, at 260.

38. Malo, On the Decrease of Population on the Hawaiian Islands, 2 THE HAWAIIAN
SPECTATOR 121, 127 (Apr. 1839).

39. Id. at 127-28.
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tenure system and, second, by reviewing the manner and scope of the
Western intrusion which tolled their demise. This interplay between
tradition and intrusion, in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries, will, in turn, shed light on whether the Kuleana Act was
enacted to accelerate, retard, or fend off the process of land alienation.
B.

The TraditionalPoliticalStructure4°
Scholars believe that the Hawaiian archipelago, which consists of

eight main islands,41 was ruled by four paramount chiefs, or ali'i nui,

at Cook's arrival in 1778.42 This number varied according to the success with which particular chiefs conquered new territories or
defended old ones. 3 Kamehameha I may have been the first ali'i nui
to dominate the entire island chain, and that only after many years of
scheming, warfare, and foreign assistance.' Regardless of how many
ali'i nui ruled over the islands, the structures by which they ruled
appear to have been fairly stable and uniform at the time of contact
with the West.4 5
In essence, the political system placed an ali'i nui with supreme
authority at the head of a territory which he had, more often than not,
conquered." The ali'i nui carved up his territory into districts over
40. The view of traditional land tenure contained in legal and administrative documents is
discussed later in Sections III, IV, and V. The description of the political structure given here is
that of historians and social scientists who, better than lawmakers, are trained to describe social
phenomena. The object of this section is to describe what the reality was, as much as possible,
not what subsequent lawmakers thought or desired it to be. The principal historical and
anthropological sources used in the description that follows are: G. DAWS, SHOAL OF TIME: A
HISTORY OF THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS (1968); E. HANDY & M. PUKUI, THE POLYNESIAN
FAMILY SYSTEM IN KA'U, HAWAI'I (1958); M. Kelly, supra note 8; R. KUYKENDALL, supra
note 8; C. LYONS, A HISTORY OF THE HAWAIIAN GOVERNMENT SURVEY WITH NOTES ON

LAND MATTERS IN HAWAII (1903); Malo, supra note 38.
41. The eight islands are, starting with the geologically oldest and northernmost: Ni'ihau,
Kaua'i, O'ahu, Moloka'i, Lana'i, Mau'i, Kahoolawe, Hawal'i. G. MACDONALD & A. ABBOTT,
VOLCANOES IN THE SEA: THE GEOLOGY OF HAWAII 6, 268 (1970).
42. M. Kelly, supra note 8, at 11.
43. Id. at 11-12.
44. G. DAWS, supra note 40, at 29-44 (1968). Whether Kamehameha I could have united
the chain without Western support will remain the eternally debatable question.
45. See M. Kelly, supra note 8, at 12. For a discussion of Hawaiian prehistory from earliest
settlement to Western contact see P. KIRCH, FEATHERED GODS AND FISHHOOKs: AN
INTRODUCTION TO HAWAIIAN ARCHAEOLOGY AND PREHISTORY (1985).

For the role of

hierarchy in Hawaiian traditional culture, see V. VALERI, KINGSHIP AND SACRIFICE: RITUAL
AND SOCIETY IN ANCIENT HAWAII (1985).

46. See R. KUYKENDALL, supra note 8, at 9-10. Another high chief was the kahuna nui
who, as supreme ritual specialist, guided the ali'i nui in the worship of gods. M. Kelly, supra
note 8, at 45. He was very powerful and, theoretically, could exercise that power to check the
ali'i nui. In practice, however, both the kahuna nui and the kalaimoku, or land divider, served
only as the ali'i nui's principal counselors, ritual and secular. Id. at 43-44.
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which he placed trusted chiefs drawn from the ranks of aides, relatives, or allies. These chiefs or ali'i, in turn, placed still lower chiefs or
retainers at the head of smaller and smaller subdivisions. At the bottom were the maka'ainana, or commoners, who worked the land.4 7
Conversely, the surplus product of maka'ainana labor moved
upwards, through several levels-four, five, or six deep-to support
agents, chiefs, and the ali'i nui.48
While the broad outlines of this system recall Western feudalism,
significant distinctions stand out. First, the system was by no means
militaristic. Maka'ainana did not owe military service to the ali'i.4 9
Second, the ali'i class enjoyed no hereditary claim to the land. On the
death of the ali'i nui, lesser chiefs lost their holdings unless his successor confirmed them, an event which was rare.5" Third, maka'ainana
were not bound to the territory of a particular chief, but could move
freely in search of better conditions."1 Extensive kinship networks,
which cut across boundary lines, facilitated this continual reallocation
52
of persons to land.
Because the wealth and power of the ali'i flowed from the labor of
the maka'ainana, who could withhold their services by moving to
another division, the ali'i generally exercised restraint in their
demands on the commoners.5 3 Furthermore, even though Hawai'i
47. "Maka'ainana" comes close to the English word "commoner." M. PUKUI & S. ELBERT,
supra note 3, at 207. "Hoa'aina" is translated as "tenant." Id. at 68. Strictly speaking,
maka'ainana denotes a status which is fixed, while hoa'aina denotes a relative position in a
relationship based on land. A person could be the hoa'aina of a particular chief and in turn be
the landlord of another hoa'aina. A person could not, however, be chief and maka'ainana at the
same time.
48. The stratification intensified in the first half of the 19th century, such that land had six or
eight owners at the same time, one above the other. Linnekin, The Hui Lands of Keanae:
Hawaiian Land Tenure and the Great Mahele, 92 J. POLYNESIAN SOC'Y 169, 171 (1983).
49. J. CHINEN, supra note 9, at 6.
50. Id. at 5. Even the son of an ali'i nui did not typically succeed to his father's status and
property. Usurpations via wars were fairly standard means of succeeding to ali'i nui status. See
R. KUYKENDALL, supra note 8, at 10. A new ali'i nui would not likely trust his predecessor's
retainers sufficiently to reappoint them: "[W]hen a chief was overthrown in war his followers also
moved on." S. KAMAKAU, RULING CHIEFS OF HAWAII 376 (1961).

51. J. CHINEN, supra note 9, at 6.
52. For descriptions of this typically Polynesian tradition which permits a highly flexible
rearrangement of population to fit available resources, see R. FIRTH, PRIMITIVE POLYNESIAN
ECONOMY (2d ed. 1965); E. HANDY & M. PUKUI, supra note 40; J. LINNEKIN, CHILDREN OF
IN A HAWAIIAN COMMUNITY (1985). For a lighter
version of the same observation, see F. CALKINS, MY SAMOAN CHIEF (1962).
53. "[F]or a chief was called great in proportion to the number of his people .... " Malo,
supra note 38, at 125.
THE LAND: EXCHANGE AND STATUS
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was, of all Pacific societies, the most ideologically hierarchical, 4 materially it remained a subsistence economy. Traditional Hawaiians did
not produce technologically elaborate luxury goods, or surplus products sufficient to exchange for such goods. In any event, until Cook's
time, such products were unknown and unobtainable. The ali'i, then,
after extracting their share of food, clothing, shelter, and minimal luxuries from the maka'ainana, found little else to command. In sum, the
traditional political structure gave the maka'ainana little formal
power, but considerable economic security. The ali'i, on the other
hand, retained what formal glory there was, but enjoyed little political
55

stability.

C. The TraditionalLand Tenure System
Early foreign visitors wrote admiringly of the well-tended gardens
of taro, yam, and sweet potatoes which supported a dense population
of healthy-looking Hawaiians.5 6 The size and welfare of the population rested on an extensive land use system. A Western observer, in
1875, keenly noted that the long occupancy of the islands had produced a "minute subdivision of land, and nomenclature thereof.
Every piece of land had its name, as individual and characteristic as
that of its cultivation." 57 The complexity of exploitation reflected in
the observed nomenclature demonstrated the degree, outstanding in
Polynesia,5 8 to which Hawaiians had come to master and depend upon
terrestrial, rather than marine, resources. Just about every nook,
54. Elsewhere in the Pacific, the bases of social organization were kin groups, not classes.
Power, instead of being concentrated in the ali'i, was dispersed among family or lineage heads.
The anthropologist Marshall Sahlins believes this class feature-where the ali'i ceased to be
kinsmen of, but had become alien to, the maka'ainana--combined with Hawai'i's relative
proximity to the American continent to effect the spectacular disintegration of Hawaiian society.
The ali'i never exerted quite the same care for the maka'ainana that other Polynesian family
heads expended on their relatives. Nonetheless, the old technologically primitive economic order
checked the potential for abuse by the ali'i. When, however, Westerners positioned themselves as
the ali'i's new suppliers of sophisticated goods, the latter quickly dispensed with whatever
consideration they may have had for the maka'ainana. Lecture by M. Sahlins to the Pacific
Islands Studies Program, Honolulu (1981). For a structuralist analysis by an anthropologist of
the relationship between all'i, commoner, and foreigner, see M. SAHLINs, HISTORICAL
METAPHORS AND MYTHICAL REALITIES: STRUCTURE IN THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE

SANDWICH ISLANDS KINGDOM 28-32 (1981).
55. See S. KAMAKAU, supra note 50, at 376. "But it was they [the chiefs] who were the
wanderers; the people born of the soil remained ...." Id.
56. THE JOURNALS OF CAPTAIN JAMES COOK ON His VOYAGES OF DISCOVERY: THE

VOYAGE OF THE RESOLUTION AND DISCOVERY 1776-1780, at 612, 618-20 (J. Beaglehole ed.
1967) [hereinafter JOURNALS].
57. C. LYONS, supra note 40, at 23.
58. Except for the Maori in Aotearoa (New Zealand), other Polynesian cultures (included in
a triangular zone bounded by Hawai'i, New Zealand, and Easter Island) developed on islands
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cranny, field, landform, altitude, and species were exploited: "Hawaiian life vibrated from uka, mountain, whence came wood, kapa, for
clothing, olona, for fish-line, ti-leaf for wrapping paper, iefor ratan
lashing, wild birds for food, to the kai; sea, whence came ia,fish, and
all connected therewith."5 9 This extensive exploitation made sense
given the geological youth of the islands, which had as yet welcomed
relatively few plants and animals to their shores. What species existed
had, of necessity, to be used regularly, and ingeniously.6
Both the land and sea yielded food to the maka'ainana.61 Up in the
wet valleys, they cultivated lush, high-yielding irrigated gardens of
taro. Down in the more arid plains, they grew yam, sweet potato, and
dry-land taro. In addition, commoners tended subsidiary crops of
sugar cane, bread-fruit, banana, and coconut. At sea, in the mountains, and on fallow and uncultivated lands, Hawaiians hunted or
gathered fish, birds, wood, fiber, leaves, roots, and other products
needed in their dietary and household practices. They also raised pigs
and fowl, which typically foraged for their own food. While to the
untutored Western eye, then, Hawaiians may have appeared to use
only those lands that were under cultivation, which may have
amounted to as little as one percent of the island's surface, 62 in reality
the islanders exploited a much wider terrain.6 3
A key land-use institution, the ahupua'a, organized this wide-ranging mode of exploitation." In its ideal conception, the ahupua'a was a
self-sufficient economic and administrative unit of land running from
the summit of a mountain to a broad coastal base. 65 The model
ahupua'a encompassed, within its borders, all the types of terrain,
resources, and species useful to Hawaiian livelihood. 6 In practice,
that were smaller, closer to the tropics, and therefore richer in lagoon life, than Hawai'i. As a
result, their people relied relatively less on the land, and more on the sea, than the Hawaiians.
59. C. LYONS, supra note 40, at 24.
60. For a recent study of the chronological span of human ecology in Hawai'i, see J.
CULLINEY, ISLANDS IN A FAR SEA: NATURE AND MAN IN HAWAII (1988).
61. See R. KUYKENDALL, supra note 8, at 6.
62. M. Kelly, supra note 8, at 3.
63. Nineteenth century documents often speak of "waste land" when they mean wild or
fallow lands. This conceptual confusion did much to legitimize the alienation of maka'ainana
from their lands, for it fostered the view that maka'ainana did not use, and therefore could not
claim, such lands.
64. For an early description of the ahupua'a, see C. LYONS, supra note 40, at 23-29.
65. J. CHINEN, supra note 9, at 3. The fisheries law enacted in 1839 indicates that the
seaward boundary of the ahupua'a took in the far side of the reef. Haalelea v. Montgomery, 2

Haw. 62, 65-66 (1858).
66. See J. CHINEN, supra note 9, at 3.
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however, ahupua'a varied considerably in form and expanse." Nevertheless, most took in some coastline and enough of the slopes to satisfy
the standard needs of their occupants for the products of the sea,
plain, valley, and mountain.68
The administration of the ahupua'a rested with the konohii. 69 The
konohiki enjoyed certain rights to the land and resources of the
ahupua'a, and to the labor and surplus products of its occupants.7' In
return, he secured for the ali'i nui the latter's expected share of the
ahupua'a's wealth. 7 The necessity of providing adequately for both
himself and the ali'i nui generally compelled the konohiki to manage
the economy of the ahupua'a in such a way as to both conserve and
enrich its human and natural resources. The building and regulation
of canals and ditches, which carried water into the highly productive
wet taro terraces, for example, became a primary responsibility of the
konohiki.7 2
67. See id. Ahupua'a, cut off by the odd shape of neighboring divisions, often failed to extend
to either the mountain or the seashore. They ranged in size from 100 to 100,000 acres. Id.
68. See id.
69. Id Few administrative systems are as simple as their models suggest. While Hawaiian
lands were generally divided into ahupua'a, with an ali'i or konohiki at the head of each, there
existed another land use unit which in part copied, and in part disordered, the neat scheme of the
ahupua'a. This was the ili, or the subdivision of the ahupua'a. C. LYONS, supra note 40, at 27.
Ili were of two types: the ii of the ahupua'a, and the ili kupono. The former remained under
the jurisdiction of the chief of the ahupua'a, and was established purely for administrative
convenience. The chief might, for example, appoint separate agents to oversee the different ili of
his ahupua'a. The ili kupono, however, was directly awarded by the ali'i nui to another chief
who, therefore, owed nothing to the konohiki of the ahupua'a. The ill kupono, then, remained
practically independent of the ahupua'a in which it was located. At the death of the head of the
ahupua'a, while the rest of the ahupua'a might be reassigned by the ali'i nui, the ill kupono was
not. Simply put, the ili kupono was like an ahupua'a within the ahupua'a. See id. at 28.
Physically speaking, ili could consist of a single tract of land, or of discontinuous pieces. In
the latter case, they were called ili lele ("jumping" ili). The pieces could be in one or more
ahupua'a. The rationale for the "jump" was to provide chiefs and occupants of ill lele with
terrain sufficiently heterogeneous that a diversified and therefore self-sufficient economy could be
established under their control. See id. at 27. For another description of the ili system, see J.
CHINEN, supra note 9, at 3-6.
70. J. CHINEN, supra note 9, at 5-6.
71. M. Kelly, supra note 8, at 38. The ahupua'a derived its name from the fact that its
"boundary was marked by a heap (ahu) of stones surmounted by an image of a pig (pua'a), or
because a pig or other tribute was laid on the altar as tax to the chief." M. PuKuI & S. ELBERT,
supra note 3, at 8. At the annual makahiki festival, when the ali'i nui's entourage circled the
island to collect taxes, it would pick up what the occupants of the ahupua'a deposited at this
altar. M. Kelly, supra note 8, at 37-38.
72. A. Perry, A Brief History of Hawaiian Water Rights 7, Address at the Annual Dinner of
the Hawaiian Bar Association (June 15, 1912) (available at the University of Hawai'i Library).
The word "kanawai," which in Hawaiian means law, or regulation, originally denoted rules
dealing specifically with the use of water. M. PUtKU & S. ELBERT, supranote 3, at 119. For the
theory, tested primarily against ancient Asian societies, that civilization and law arise typically as
a result of a leader taking charge of a system of irrigation, boosting crop production, collecting
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The administrative and ecological parameters of the ahupua'a thus
fostered an economic self-sufficiency that required little supplementation from inter-ahupua'a barter.7 3 Self-sufficiency was further
advanced by a land tenure system that conferred liberal rights in the
resources of the ahupua'a upon the maka'ainana, who were thereby
encouraged to extend the range of their economic activities. Activities
commonly carried on by the occupants of an ahupua'a included: The
cultivation of plots of land for family consumption; the clearing of
stretches of kula7 4 for dry-land crops; the use of water from springs,
streams, and ditches to irrigate wet taro; the catching of fish off shore;
the hunting of birds and gathering of wild plants; the raising of pigs
and fowl; the building of various structures in which to conduct rituals, sleep, cook, eat, and store items.7" Finally, occupants enjoyed
freedom of movement within the ahupua'a,76 both to realize these
rights, and to engage in the exchange of goods and services.
D. The Impact of the West77
That maka'ainana should enjoy such varied rights in the use of the
land and the sea, based solely upon their occupancy of, and labor in,
an ahupua'a, was well-nigh unfathomable to the foreigners who followed Cook to the islands. Incomprehension, in due course, metamorphosed into opposition. By the early decades of the nineteenth
century, foreigners, anxious to develop Hawai'i's land, banded
together to overcome what, for them, constituted an intolerably broad
range of maka'ainana rights in the ahupua'a.7"
the surplus, and thereby feeding a nonproductive class of specialists (military, ritual,
administrative, and artistic), see generally K. WnITFOGEL, ORIENTAL DESPOTISM: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF TOTAL POWER

(1957).

73. See M. Kelly, supra note 8, at 31-32.
74. Relatively dry open plains lying between higher wetlands and the coast are known as
kula. M. PUKUI & S. ELBERT, supra note 3, at 164.
75. See R. KUYKENDALL, supra note 8, at 5.
76. See supra text accompanying notes 51, 52.
77. This subsection relies heavily on the work of Marion Kelly in which she states:
Changes in land tenure, rights, and use are part of the total picture of cultural change and
cannot be treated as a separate subject in the earliest stages of culture contact. One question
might be used as a guide: Why did the Hawaiian culture disappear so rapidly and so
completely? An answer should include a statement about the Europeans who came to the
islands with new ideas ....
M. KELLY, supra NOTE 8, AT 50.
78. See R. KUYKENDALL, supra note 8, at 273-78, 294-98.
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L

The Needs of Westerners

The foreigners who flocked to Hawai'i after 1778 included explorers, traders, missionaries, whalers, and investors. 79 They arrived
somewhat in that order, bearing somewhat different histories and
ambitions. Captain James Cook's voyages coincided with the first
phase of European industrialization which, as it progressed, propelled
Europeans into the non-Western world to seek out raw materials and
new markets. Although an Englishman first made Hawai'i's existence
known to the West, England thereafter evinced little interest in the
archipelago.8" It fell to Americans, first from the East Coast and then
from the West, to-fully exploit, and indeed ravage, Hawai'i's physical
and social resources.
The material havoc that Western contact produced poses no puzzle
when one recalls that the island ecosystem, like its people, had been
isolated from the rest of the world for several centuries. Both proved
highly vulnerable when stressed by heretofore unknown predators, diseases, and demands. And demand there was, as the ecosystem confronted the heavy task of reprovisioning the many whaling ships and
trading vessels that rapidly followed Cook to the islands.8 1 The personnel of these vessels, in addition, left behind certain physical and
economic legacies that changed the face of Hawai'i. While the crews
of the ships were busy spreading devastating illnesses among the general population gathered around the harbor towns, the merchants who
shipped with them were themselves infecting another class of
Hawaiians, the ali'i, with a different disease: the love of foreign goods.
The chiefs first paid for these goods with food and water, then with
sandalwood, and finally, with land.82
When traditional supplies of food dwindled, reprovisioning simply
took on a new form. Enterprising foreigners stepped in to raise
79. M. Kelly, supra note 8, at 81-89. These were anything but mutually exclusive categories
as, typically, explorer turned trader, and saint became sugar baron. The metamorphosis,
predictably, veered in the direction of increased accumulation of power and wealth. For an
account of these transformations, see generally G. DAws, supra note 40.
80. Hawai'i was simply too small and too far away. Cook's task had been to discover the
long-posited Northwest Passage that would miraculously contract the distance between England
and China. It was the immensity of the Chinese empire, and not the scattered islands of Hawai'i,
that tantalized the commercial appetite of Europe. See JOURNALS, supra note 56, at xxxii-xxxiii.
81. In 1822 over 60 whalers anchored in Hawaiian ports. Between 1826 and 1829 the port of
Honolulu alone averaged 140 whalers annually. In 1841 a station on Maui reported 30 ships
anchored in Lahaina at any given time, with more than 400 sailors on shore daily. M. Kelly,
supra note 8, at 101.

82. See id. at 94-100.
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imported crops and animals for the shipping clientele. 83 The agricultural success of the foreign farmers, however, developed at the expense
of the maka'ainana, whose premium lands and waters the King and
chiefs too readily committed to the reprovisioning trade.84 Lands not
reassigned did not thereby necessarily escape devastation: introduced
stocks of sheep, goats, and cattle wandered over the commoners'
lands, grazing, nibbling, or trampling away many of the indigenous
flora upon which Hawaiians relied.8 5
The success of the foreign establishment attracted yet more Western
capital and people to the islands. By 1820, the missionaries also
arrived, 86 making complete the elementary framework of Western civilization: Corn, wheat, sheep, goats, cows, capitalists, and clerics. But
one ingredient crucial to Western culture was still missing: the private
ownership of land. Increasingly, foreigners chafed at its absence.
Their frustration mounted when, due to the uncertainty of the whaling
enterprise, the reprovisioning trade faltered.8 7 The foreign community
needed to find a new way to make money. The solution that soon
presented itself to them was large-scale agricultural production for the
booming market of California. 8 First, however, the perceived indeterminacy and insecurity of landholding in Hawai'i had to be
corrected.
2.

Conflicting Values

The Westerners' frustration with traditional Hawaiian land tenure
exposed the fundamental incompatibility that in fact existed between
Hawaiian and Western economic thought. Nineteenth century capitalism revolved around the concept of individual enterprise. Additionally, it assigned a definite monetary value to goods and services, and
espoused "rational" economic transactions in which the maximization
of profit counted for everything. By contrast, the Hawaiian economy
assumed that neither individuals nor classes could be self-sufficient.
Ali'i needed maka'ainana and vice versa: the one mediated with the
gods and allocated resources, such as land and water; the other provided manpower and produced food. Furthermore, families at the
coast typically exchanged fish for taro with families in the interior, and
83. See id. at 101-03; R. KUYKENDALL, supra note 8, at 317-18.
84. M. Kelly, supra note 8, at 116-17.
85. "Left unmolested, the cattle multiplied and prospered, eventually contributing to the ruin
of subsistence agriculture in many parts of the islands." Linnekin, supra note 48, at 176.
86. G. DAWS, supra note 40, at 63-65.
87. R. KUYKENDALL, supra note 8, at 310-11.
88. Id. at 310.
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within kin groups, continuous exchanges of labor, for such things as
building houses and making canoes, took place. Because families,
classes, and ahupua'a existed from time immemorial, by Hawaiian
reckoning, and would continue to exist, it was unnecessary as well as
unwise to calculate the exact value of particular transactions. 89 Over
the long run, losses and gains balanced out and, in any event, a valuable long term relationship should not be sacrificed for a short term
advantage. What Westerners called rational maximization of profit,

Hawaiians rejected as intransigent, antisocial, short-sighted and downright foolish behavior.90
Land, which capitalists treat like any other commodity or factor of
production, was for Hawaiians an economic valuable also, but one
enmeshed in social relationships and pregnant with spiritual meaning.
The term for family, "ohana," consists of the word "oha," denoting
offshoots or sprouts of the parent taro plant, and the suffix "na,"
meaning "that which."9 1 A family, attached to its house lots and gar-

den plots, is therefore like a taro plant rooted in the soil: both send out
and sustain younger offshoots. Residence and labor in an ahupua'a, in
turn, conferred rights to water and other valuable resources which the
family alone could not control. Finally, submission to the paramount
chief connected the individual, his family, and his lands to the ali'i
nui's great spiritual power, or mana. 92 Land, then, bound together
89. Unwise, because a transaction in which a perfectly equivalent exchange takes place tends
to terminate a relationship, and the goal was to extend indefinitely relationships that could be
called on in the future. Thus, Hawaiians who accepted a moderately sized nail from Cook in
return for enough hog to feed his entire ship's crew for a day were not thereby undervaluing their
hog in some foolish way. Rather, they may have been acknowledging what they took to be a
token of his desire to maintain a relationship. M. Kelly, supra note 8,at 53.
90. The economic anthropologist Karl Polanyi provides the analytical tools with which to
understand this contrast. In speaking of types of exchanges that differentiate economies, he
draws attention to two that are not primarily associated with Western systems: reciprocity and
redistribution. The fish and taro that Hawaiian families exchanged, and the Christmas gifts that
Westerners give one another, are examples of reciprocal goods, approximately equivalent in
value, moving directly between parties of equal standing, as an incident and binder of their social
relationship. Redistributive goods are what Hawaiians sent to the ali'i, for the latter's
consumption, and for redistribution to chiefly retainers and other specialists-such as priests and
managers of the dikes-who, in turn, presumably provided a service to the maka'ainana. The
taxes that modem governments levy and use to build roads and schools are another example of
redistributive exchange. Market exchanges, on the other hand, are what dominate the economic
life of industrialized countries: groceries, for example, received in return for an exact amount of
dollars tendered to an unknown seller. This market economy was unknown in traditional
Hawai'i. See K. PoLANYi, THE GREAT TRANsFORMATION 43, 47-48 (1944).
91. E. HANDY & M. PUKUI, supra note 40, at 3.
92. "Mana" is a concept shared by all Polynesian societies. It is that which makes the fish
plentiful, the land fruitful, and the chief successful. Perhaps best described as a raw and
powerful force of nature, it is not associated with gods. Only certain individuals, usually chiefs,
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classes, ahupua'a residents, and families in a network of wealth that
was diffusely produced and reciprocally exchanged. In pre-contact
Hawai'i, no other source of wealth existed. When foreigners came
bearing ships, guns, clocks, silks, and the knowledge of a wider world,
they in effect presented themselves as an alternate source of wealth.
This new source quickly displaced, or at least depreciated, the old
source, which was the land, and those who made it fruitful, the commoners. Consequently, when the ali'i chose to pay for foreign goods
and services with bits and pieces of Hawaiian land, they were, in that
fateful gesture, handing over the thread that would unravel the fabric
of Hawaiian society.
3.

The Role of the Ali'i

As stated, the physical devolution of the natural and human
resources of Hawai'i may be accounted for by the untested nature of
both its ecology and its inhabitants' immune systems. Responsibility
for the severity of the subsequent social disintegration, however, must
be laid, in large part, with the Westerners and the ali'i. These two
groups, intentionally or otherwise, acted in concert to pry the
maka'ainana from their traditional lands.93
The relationship between chiefs and foreigners was established when
Captain James Cook, on his visits, met with various ali'i to negotiate
for the needs of his ship, crew, and research mission.94 When Cook's
companion, Captain George Vancouver, returned to the islands in the
early 1790's, he encouraged the several ali'i to support the drive of one
are strong enough to capture, tolerate, and radiate this incorporeal, but natural, force. See D.
OLIVER, supra note 29, at 72-73.
93. Needless to say, not all foreigners and chiefs acted with blame. For many, however, the
picture fits. For detailed histories of the relationship between ali'i and Westerners, see generally
G. DAWS, supra note 40; R. KUYKENDALL, supra note 8; M. Kelly, supra note 8. A little
appreciated phenomenon of colonial situations is that colonialists and native aristocrats are never
so powerful as when they team up. A Westerner at home may believe in unbridled economic
individualism but will normally lack the political power to translate that belief into economic
monopoly. In a society like traditional Hawai'i, on the other hand, the aristocrats theoretically
detained all political power but were, in practice, restrained by a primitive technology and a
communitarian ethic. In the colonial context, both sets of restraints fall and a new synthesis of
absolute power emerges. The relationship between ali'i and Westerners in Hawai'i was not
necessarily smooth, happy, or even actively nurtured. All the same, it was patterned, potent, and
apparently mutually convenient for it lasted some one hundred years, until the overthrow of the
monarchy in 1893. By then, an alien system of laws already protected foreign capital in the
islands. Americans owned most of the land, controlled the government, and had a favorable
relationship with the United States. The ali'i had outlived their usefulness. See G. DAws, supra
note 40, at 251-92.
94. See G. DAWS, supra note 40, at 1-28.
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of them, Kamehameha, to unite the islands.9 5 A single King, as
opposed to several ali'i nui, would make the foreign task of negotiating
agreements far more efficient. Vancouver's exhortations received the
persuasive backing of Kamehameha's already considerable display of
Western support-advisors, ships, and guns.9 6 Most chiefs soon
enough acquiesced.9 7 Thus casually did monarchy come to Hawai'i,
not springing from internal necessity, but slipping into place, so to
speak, because native ambition chanced to coincide with foreign
convenience. 98
The alliance between ali'i and Westerner, of which monarchy was
only the most dramatic byproduct, linked together, again and again,
local chiefs and a succession of enterprising, knowledgeable, or simply
astute white men who congregated to the islands. 9 9 In essence, their
alliance was economic. The ships that came to Hawai'i needed provisions on a large scale."°° Only the ali'i, by giving tacit approval if not
active direction, could sanction the transfer of such vast quantities of
goods. In return, the chiefs received the major part of the foreigners'
bounty: 10 1 at first, trinkets, nails, and other petty metal goods; 10 2 later,
luxury items, weapons, and even ships. As the goods brought by the
foreigners increased in value, so did their demands on the ali'i.
Other than food and water, outsiders initially desired only sandalwood, which grew in the high interior. Kamehameha I, who declared
a monopoly on foreign trade and claimed the precious sandalwood for
himself, purchased six large foreign ships with it.'" 3 After his death, a
weaker King, Liholiho, was forced to share the precious resource with
the ali'i. 1 This set off a cutting frenzy, during which thousands of
commoners were sent up into the mountains to bring down the
95. M. Kelly, supra note 8, at 70.
96. Id. at 73.
97. Id. at 69-73.
98. Id. It is not contended here that chiefs did not try to unify the islands before Western
contact, or that Kamehameha I unified Hawai'i for the convenience of foreigners. What is noted
is that the traditional society had defeated earlier attempts at unity, and that, whatever the
impact, Kamehameha's campaign received ample Western backing.
99. G. DAWS, supra note 40, at 46. There were, of course, many white men in the islands
who did not fit this description. At the turn of the century, almost every district on the large
islands had one or two white residents, most of whom were "miserable loafers, human flotsam
and jetsam." Id.
100. M. Kelly, supra note 8, at 53-54.
101. IALat 65-66.
102. Metal was highly prized, because the Hawaiians did not mine any themselves. G.

DAWS, supra note 40, at 5.
103. M. Kelly, supra note 8, at 95.

104. Id. at 96.
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fragrant wood, with drastic effect upon agriculture." 5 Fields were
abandoned, and famine became common. Underfed and ill prepared
for the long, cold, and damp days in the mountains, commoners, who
0 6
were by now exposed to new diseases, died at an alarming rate.
Their deaths, in turn, deprived the chiefs of0 the
labor which the latter
7
needed to sustain the traditional economy.1
Unable to produce goods with which to pay for foreign purchases,
Liholiho and the chiefs took the time-honored step of people who live
beyond their means: they went into debt. By 1826, traders in Honolulu were claiming an ali'i indebtedness of $200,000. 108 Some of the
debt was paid off, over the years, through the imposition of taxes,
including taxes payable in sandalwood."0 9 But by 1830, the sandalwood was almost gone."' 0 Many commoners had died, and many now
lived in the new coastal towns to which they had drifted, out of curiosity, and in the hope of avoiding the onerous task of hauling sandalwood. Besides, the neglect of fields and waterways over the years had
rendered many traditional gardens unworkable, thereby further constricting traditional agriculture. The drop in population, finally, fundamentally disrupted the social and economic life of rural
communities. "'
Chiefs, however, continued to run up debts, and foreign agents continued to collect on them. These creditors, now comfortably established in the islands as resident merchants, usually on lands granted or
leased by a grateful King or a spendthrift chief, in time demanded
protection for their holdings and investments." 2 They were able to
back up their demands with telling references to the military might of
their home governments, whose warships conspicuously cruised, now
and then, in Hawaiian waters.' '3
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 97.
108. R. KUYKENDALL, supra note 8, at 91, 434-36.
109. M. Kelly, supra note 8, at 98.
Missionaries living on Hawaii during these years wrote that long lines of people carrying
logs were seen all the way from Waimea to Kawaihae, a distance of about twelve to fifteen
miles. The chiefs now served as unofficial deputies for the commercial agents in the
exploitation of the Hawaiian people and forests. They were in effect 'captive' chiefs.
Id. at 99.
110.
111.
112.
113.
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Id. at 99-100.
See id. at 96; R. KUYKENDALL, supra note 8, at 88-90.
See supra text accompanying note 78.
J. CHINEN, supra note 9, at 7.
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4.

The Recourse to Law

Many of the concessions sought by foreigners had to be guaranteed
in law. The monarchy did not, however, single-mindedly rush to gratify every foreign legal whim. Some laws, on the contrary, were drafted
for the specific purpose of warding off foreign rapacity. 114 Ambivalence, in other words, marked the origin and development of modem
Hawaiian law. This was hardly surprising, for, by 1839, when the
Hawaiian government promulgated its first major modem law, the
Declaration of Rights,115 a new social complexity had emerged. Sixty
years of exposure to the outside world had by then sufficiently unsettled Hawaiian society, spawning in the process new native and foreign
subgroups which pursued socially inconsistent ends, that the law
would come to reflect, if not resolve, the contradictions at hand.
Kamehameha III and his highest chiefs, some of whom later joined
his advisory Privy Council,' 1 6 initially exercised the power to enact
laws. The prestige and relative material security of this group permitted it to express, via the early laws, a considerable magnanimity
towards the commoners, whose plight the Council frequently recognized and attempted to ameliorate. The lesser chiefs and konohiki,
who were more easily manipulated by foreigners, also participated,
after the 1840 Constitution, in a House of Nobles endowed with legislative powers.' 7 The same Constitution also empowered commoners
to participate in the legislative process, through their popularly chosen
delegates, who sat in a House of Representatives." 8 Many who served
in that lower chamber were not, of course, typical maka'ainava, but
graduates of missionary schools, " 9 where they had learned a fair body
of Western social and legal concepts which they now put to use to
advance the interests of their class.
As for the foreigners, their allegiances, legal or otherwise, shifted
about between complex considerations: National, denominational,
and occupational. Ultimately, however, they looked most to their
material self-interest, which they could pursue with aggressive
114. For example, Kamehameha III divided the lands he claimed in the Great Mahele into
government and Crown Lands, governed by separate regimes, because he was advised that
should a foreign power usurp the kingdom, it would lay claim only to government, not Crown,
lands. In re Estate of His Majesty Kamehameha IV, 2 Haw. 715, 722 (1864).
115. The Declaration of Rights can be found in L. THURSTON, supra note 6, at 1-2.
116. R. KUYKENDALL, supra note 8, at 263.
117. Id at 169.

118. Id
119. The most famous missionary school in the islands was Lahainaluna on Maui. The
Hawaiian historian David Malo, who was trained there, in time became an influential nationalist
writer, activist, and social critic. See id at 111, 157; see also supra note 38.
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determination. A fraction only, usually from among the missionaries
or personalities in the service of the Hawaiian government, evinced
any real concern for maka'ainana interests. That concern, however,
inevitably exhibited its own tinge of cultural blindness or arrogance,
which expressed itself, for example, in the insistence that what was
good for a New England yeoman was also ideal for a Hawaiian
maka'ainana. 120 It is, then, against this background of general physical devolution, social antinomy, and ideological implausibility, that
the laws affecting land tenure, enacted between 1839 and 1850, must
be examined.12 The Article now turns to these laws.
III.

THE KULEANA ACT

When Kamehameha I unified the islands in 1810,122 he assigned his
newly amassed lands in accordance with ancient and well-tested political principles. The choicest lands he kept for his personal use and
enjoyment; the remainder he gave to his principal warrior chiefs who,
in turn, distributed their shares to lesser retainers. 123 Under
Kamehameha's reign, only one practice departed significantly from
tradition: Kamehameha I "permitted the heirs of a deceased chief to
remain on the ahupua'a"' 124 where formerly the holding would have
reverted to the ali'i nui. All who possessed land, from commoners on
up, owed Kamehameha I a land tax, services he demanded at will, and
a portion of the land's products. 125
Kamehameha II, when he came to the throne, did not institute any
majorchange in the land tenure system, except that, by "leaving the
great majority of the lands with the chiefs who had been rewarded by
his father,"1 26 he further strengthened the stability of ali'i tenure and
reinforced the expectation that chiefs would hold land hereditarily. In
this expectation, the chiefs were joined by the white residents who,
"accustomed in their homeland to possessing lands in fee simple...
vigorously challenged the right of the King and the chiefs to dispossess
'
them at will." 127
Together, the ali'i and the foreigners compelled the
government, during the reign of Kamehameha III, to enact a series of
120. See supra text accompanying note 23.
121. The evolution of land rights in Hawai'i, from the time of Kamehameha I's unification of
the islands at the beginning of the 19th century until the 1848 execution of the Great Mahele, is
briefly summarized in J. CHINEN, supra note 9.
122. G. DAWS, supra note 40, at 43.
123. J. CHINEN, supra note 9, at 6.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 7.
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laws to westernize the nature of land tenure. The Kuleana Act, passed
in 1850, culminated that series.
A.

The Pre-1850 Land Tenure Laws

128

The early laws were of two kinds: Constitutional and statutory. The
former, which predated the latter and controlled their interpretation,
consist of the 1839 Declaration of Rights 129 and the 1840 Constitution,13 both granted by Kamehameha III. Several land tenure statutes were then enacted between 1840 and 1846. Significant provisions
of those statutes were restated in an 1846 document called the Princi-

ples Adopted by the Board of Commissioners to Quiet Land Titles in the
Adjudication of Claims Presentedto Them ("Principles").13 1 The relevance of these three documents to the Kuleana Act is examined below.

L

The Declarationof Rights

Kamehameha III and his chiefs first legally addressed, in the Western sense, the issue of land tenure in the Declaration of Rights of
1839.132 The Declaration initiated a "peaceful but complete revolution in the entire polity of the Kingdom" 133 because it started the process, carried forward in the 1840 Constitution, of limiting the powers
and attributes of the King as absolute ruler, and of grounding his government on certain enunciated principles. The most important of
these, in relation to land tenure, stated:
128. This Section, in contrast to Section II, presents the legal, as opposed to anthropological,
analysis of relevant events between 1839 and 1850. However, bills of rights, constitutions,
statutes, and laws are all, anthropologically speaking, artifacts of a culture alien to the Hawaiians
of the time. Polynesians did not view Western legal instruments in the same light as those
culturally attached to such things. No doubt the Hawaiians were aware of the foreigners'
fondness for these oddities and, out of necessity as well as self-interest, consented to enact laws
that Westerners would accept. That the written law could not quickly reform social reality,
however, is borne out by this passage from the Principlesof the Land Commission:
Neither the laws of 1839 nor of 1840 were found adequate to protect the inferior lords and
tenants, for although the violators of law, of every rank, were liable to its penalty, yet it was
so contrary to ancient usage, to execute the law on the powerful for the protection of the
weak, that the latter often suffered ....
Principles Adopted by the Board of Commissioners to Quiet Land Titles in their Adjudication of
Claims Presented to Them, reprintedin 2 REv.LAWS HAW. 2124,2127 (1925) [hereinafter Land
Commission Principles].
129. L. THURSTON, supra note 6, at 1.
130. Id.at 2.
131. 2 REv. LAWS HAW. 2124 (1925).
132. L. THURSTON, supra note 6, at 1. The Declaration of Rights stated the overall policy of
the government vis-a-vis the general corpus of rights of the people. Those rights, however,
preeminently concerned land.
133. In re Estate of His Majesty Kamehameha IV, 2 Haw. 715, 720 (1864).
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Protection is hereby secured to the persons of all the people, together
with their lands, their building lots, and all their property, while they
conform to the laws of the kingdom, and nothing whatever shall be
taken from any individual except by express provision of the laws. 134
The Declaration also broadly committed the government to upholding the welfare of the commoners:
God has also established government, and rule for the purpose of peace;
but in making laws for the nation it is by no means proper to enact laws
for the protection of the rulers only, without also providing protection
for their subjects; neither is it proper to enact laws to enrich the chiefs
only, without regard to enriching their subjects also, and hereafter there
shall by no means be any laws enacted which are at variance with what is
above expressed, neither shall any tax be assessed, nor any service or
labor required of any man, in a manner which is at variance with the
35
above sentiments.'
2.

The First Constitution

In the next significant legal act of his reign, Kamehameha III
granted, in 1840, the kingdom's first Constitution.136 Under the rubric
"Exposition of the Principles on Which the Present Dynasty is
Founded," the Constitution stated:
Kamehameha I, was the founder of the kingdom, and to him belonged
all the land from one end of the Islands to the other, though it was not
his own private property. It belonged to the chiefs and people in common, of whom Kamehameha I was the head, and had the management
137
of the landed property.
The Constitution then clarified the role of the monarch: he is the
sovereign of all the people and the chiefs; lands forfeited for nonpayment of taxes revert to him; and no one "can convey away the smallest
portion of land" without his consent. 1 38 This attribute of kingly sovereignty was vividly displayed in Kamehameha III's declaration of new
fishing rights the previous year:
His Majesty the King, hereby takes the fishing grounds from those who
now possess them, from Hawaii to Kauai, and gives one portion of them
to the common people, another portion to the landlords, and a portion
1 39
he reserves to himself.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

L. THURSTON, supra note 6, at 1 (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 2.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Haalelea v. Montgomery, 2 Haw. 62, 65 (1858).
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3.

Land Commission Principlesand Practices

Between 1840 and 1846, when the Land Commission began its work, a
number of land tenure laws were passed. The Principles adopted by
the Land Commission restated those provisions of the laws which
were relevant to its work, and the legislature endorsed the restatement
in October of 1846.140 At its creation in 1845, the Land Commission
was asked to undertake, among other things, "the investigation and
final ascertainment or rejection of all claims of private individuals,
whether natives or foreigners, to any landed property acquired anterior to the passage of this Act." 141 Foreigners were, at this time,
advancing claims to lands allegedly granted to them by kings, queens,
chiefs, and governors. Because their claims could trigger the dangerous involvement of the emissaries of their home governments, the
Hawaiian monarchy looked to the Land Commission to defuse the
issue, by either confirming or quieting the contested titles.14 2
The Land Commission, in pursuit of its task, was to observe "principles established by the civil code of the kingdom in regard to prescription, occupancy, fixtures, native usages in regard to landed
tenures, water privileges and rights of piscary, the rights of women,
the rights of absentees, tenancy and subtenancy-primogeniture and
14
rights of adoption."
Because its work entailed serious social and-political consequences,
the Land Commission adopted as its first task the study of traditional
Hawaiian land tenure. 1" The conclusion of that study is expressed in
the Principles. The latter, however, also contained proposals for modifying the traditional system. Nonetheless, as the Hawaii Supreme
Court has recognized, the Principles did, in their retrospective parts,
enunciate the historical, legal, and equitable elements of the traditional
system of land tenure recognized by the government of Hawai'i in
1846, four years before the passage of the Kuleana Act.145 For this
reason, significant provisions of the document are extensively summa-

rized below. 146
140.

.

CHINEN, supra note

9, at 12.

141. Id. at 8.
142. For this reason, the Land Commission's official name was Board of Commissioners to
Quiet Land Titles. Id
143. Id at 9.
144. Id
145. In re Estate of His Majesty Kamehameha IV, 2 Haw. 715, 718 (1864).

146. Propositions in the original Principles are not numbered. For the sake of clarity, this
paper extracts those propositions that are relevant to maka'ainana rights in land, and enumerates
them, generally in the order in which they arise in the Principles.
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1. Under Kamehameha I, principal and inferior chiefs, and tenants holding under them, had rights in the lands, or the productions of
them. The proportions were not clearly defined, but were universally
acknowledged. All owed to the King a land tax, service, and some
portion of the productions of the land. Failure to render any of these
was considered a just cause for which to forfeit the lands. It is therefore certain that the tenure was far from being allodial. The same
rights which the King possessed over the superior landlords, landlords
possessed over their inferiors, so that there was a joint ownership of
the land, the King really owning the allodium, and the person in
whose hands he placed the land holding it in trust. The superior
always had the power to dispossess his inferior, but it was not considered just and right to do it without cause, and dispossession did not
often take place. 147

2. The Declaration of Rights of 1839 protected persons, lands,
buildings, and property, and also prohibited the arbitrary dispossession of tenants.14 8
3. The King, in disposing of the allodium, should offer it first to
the superior lord holding in trust for him, to safeguard that lord's
interests. 149 Even when the superior lord shall receive an allodial title
from the King, however, he can
no more seize upon the rights of the tenants and dispossess them, than
the King can now seize upon the rights of the lords, and dispossess
them. This appears clear, not only from the first principles of justice,
but also from the
act of 1839, declaring protection for tenants as well as
150
for landlords.

4. Three parties only had vested rights in land: The King, the
landlord, and the tenant. However, ancient practice awarded the tenant less than justice and equity would suggest, and the King more than
"the permanent good of his subjects would allow." '
147. Land Commission Principles, supra note 128, at 2124-25.
148. Id. at 2125.
149. Id. The Land Commission clearly recognized that the land interests of the various social
classes in the kingdom remained undivided. Indeed, until the Great Mahele (1848) and the
Kuleana Act (1850), the Land Commission, for this very reason, issued few awards and those,
generally, in leasehold only. It simply found the task of awarding titles, where interests remained
undivided, too difficult. J. CHINEN, supra note 9, at 12. Many of the principles stated by the
Land Commission, therefore, are prospective in nature, suggesting ways in which the
government might approach not just current land claims, but also the future of land tenure in
Hawai'i.
150. Land Commission Principles, supra note 128, at 2126.
151. Id.
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5. The rights of the parties in land could be divided out in the
proportions of one-third to each, with allodial titles given to both tenants and landlords.15 2
6. Great wrong accompanied a system where several classes of
persons had undivided rights in the same lands, and where each class
was liable to claim more than its due proportions. Persons of superior
power or rank had generally been the oppressors, from the throne
down. 53 The Land Commission was formed to counter this

situation. 154
7. The whole power of the King to confer and convey land, where
a private equitable claim was recognized, now rests in the Land
Commission.1 55
8. The King, however, has not relinquished his prerogatives as
sovereign, which include the prerogative "to enforce the usufruct of
lands for the common good."15 6 Awards and titles of the Land Com1 57
mission are subject to the King's prerogatives.
9. By ordinance of June 7, 1839, landlords became proprietors of
lands actually in cultivation, but subject to claims of tenants. Uncultivated lands were under the "community of ownership" of the government and the landlords, to be distributed to those who wished to
1 58
cultivate but had no land.
10. As late as June 7, 1839, chiefs were tenants at special will of
the King in his capacity as head of the nation. But dispossession could
occur only in the interest of the public well-being. 9
11. Hawaiian rulers have developed regard for the immutable law
of property. They know that the well-being of their country depends
upon the development of resources, the principal resource being land.
152. Idk
153. Id at 2127.
154. Id
155. Id. at 2128.
156. Id
157. Id
158. Id at 2128-29. This provision restricts the landlord's control to lands "actually in
cultivation" in his ahupua'a or subdivision thereof. Id The two American members of the Land
Commission thus succeeded in introducing the Western distinction between idle and productive
land. In Hawaiian agriculture, land, to be productive, must remain idle at certain intervals,
especially if it is unirrigated kula land. Ironically, then, in providing for landless maka'ainana,
the Land Commission may have dispossessed other maka'ainana of their fallow land, or land
reserved for wild species, both of which played a necessary role in maintaining the total
subsistence economy. See Linnekin, supra note 48, at 174-78.
159. Land Commission Principles, supra note 128, at 2129. The traditional ali'i nui practice
of reassigning land upon conquest, or the death of a tenant ali'i, already eroded under
Kamehameha I and Kamehameha II, was perhaps implicitly rejected here.
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Its holder must now have a stake in it more solid than the bare permission to derive his daily bread therefrom." 6
12. Hawaiian rulers realize that civilized nations recognize private
property and they now wish "to conform themselves in the main" to
61
that practice, so as to comport with these powers.1
13. Absent an apposite law, the Land Commission could judicially
declare a principle, if in accordance with ancient usage, not in conflict
with existing law or facts, and if equitable and liberal towards claim162
ants, as against the government.
14. An award by the Land Commission followed by the payment
of a commutation to the Minister of the Interior, equal to one-third
the unimproved value of the land, extinguishes "the private rights of
the King in the land," and confers an allodium on claimants subject
only to the corporate rights of the body politic and the private rights
of tenants. 16 3 This, because even "the King has no power to convey
away the rights of individuals without their consent."'"
By act of the Legislative Council, 165 the above principles became
law on October 26, 1846.166 Until 1848, however, the Land Commission could only separate out the King's portion where a party claimed
directly from the King or government. Where chiefs and maka'ainana
also possessed interests in a particular parcel, no award could issue.
The provisions protecting the interests of tenants, in particular, were
too numerous and explicit to permit it. Clearly then, the demand of
chiefs and foreigners that land be freely bought and sold required
160. Id. at 2129-30. The Western perspective is shown in the reference to daily bread. The
Hawaiian staple was poi, derived from taro. A later passage of the Principles exhibits a more
serious Western bias: a benefit of separating out the King's interests, it states, is that a claimant
will be able
to use his property more freely, by mortgaging it for commercial objects, and by building
upon it, with the definite prospect that it will descend to his heirs. This will tend more
rapidly to an export, and to a permanency of commercial relations, without which, there can
never be such a revenue as to enable the Government to foster its internal improvements.
Id. at 2134.
161. Id. at 2130.
162. Id. at 2133.
163. Id. at 2136.
164. Id. Three highly significant points are made here: First, the earlier suggestion that each
party with interest in land (King/government, landlord, tenant) receive one-third of its value is
restated here as law, at least as concerns the government's share; second, an allodial title, i.e., free
from feudal burdens imposed by a superior lord, is not a title in fee but remains subject to
tenants' rights; third, the King, in conformity with the 1839 Declaration of Rights, may not
unilaterally convey away tenants' rights.
165. The Legislative Council was composed of the House of Nobles and the House of
Representatives sitting in joint session.
166. J. CHINEN, supra note 9, at 12.
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more drastic measures. Such measures, adopted over the next four
years, were: The Great Mahele of 1848 separating Crown from
konohiki interests; the Act of July 10, 1850,167 authorizing foreigners
to own in fee; and the Kuleana Act of August 6, 1850, extending the
fee simple regime to maka'ainana.
However, even as the government of Kamehameha III stood poised
to enact the Great Mahele and the Kuleana Act, it clearly was bound
by the Declaration of Rights, the Constitution, and the Principles to
observe certain fundamental understandings and goals pertaining to
maka'ainana interests in the land. Those understandings and goals
may be summarized as follows: Three classes of persons possessed land
in the kingdom-King, landlord, and tenant; the landlords in the
kingdom held in trust from the King; neither the King nor the ali'i
could dispossess tenants below them at will; dispossession in the past
had always been rare; notwithstanding the admitted stability of traditional maka'ainana tenure, something inadequate and uncivilized still
marked the absence of private property; the monarchy will, therefore,
now advance this new concept.
Further, the Principlesstated, in the course of establishing a private
property land regime, the government could assign one-third of the
kingdom to each of the three classes of possessors of land: King/government, landlord/konohiki, and tenant. The Land Commission, in
separating out interests in the land, will observe native custom. If
interests are separated out, the King may relinquish his feudal rights,
but he may not yield his sovereign power, which includes the power to
promote the exploitation of the land. Finally, under both the Declaration of Rights and the Constitution, the lands, property, and building
lots of the people shall not be taken except by express provision of law.
4.

The Great Mahele

The Mahele was an agreement between the King and the chiefs to
separate out, and mutually quitclaim, their interests in land. 168 The
Mahele did not, in itself, alter the rights of maka'ainana in the land.
Although the division of lands affected the King and more than 240
konohiki and involved the entire surface of the kingdom, the process
took less than three months. 169 Its preparation, however, had commanded the attention of the Legislature and the Privy Council for
167. 2 REv. LAWS HAW. 2233-34 (1925).
168. J. CHINEN, supra note 9, at 16.
169. From January 27, 1848 to March 7, 1848. Id.
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more than a year. 7 ' By December 18, 1847, the Privy Council agreed
7
on a set of rules to guide it through the Great Division.1 '
First, the rules stated, the King shall retain his private lands as his
own individual property, subject to the rights of tenants. Second, onethird of the remaining land shall become the government's, one-third
the konohiki's, and one-third the tenants'. Third, konohiki and tenants shall divide their interests on the initiative of either party.
Fourth, tenants on the King's private lands shall obtain a fee title to
one-third of the lands possessed and cultivated by them whenever they
or the King desire such a division. 172 Fifth, konohikis shall satisfy the
government's one-third share in their domains by setting aside one73
third of their lands, or its money equivalent, to the government.'
The konohiki did not receive title to their lands by virtue of the
Great Mahele.174 Title required the additional steps of confirming
claims with the Land Commission, and of tendering commutation to
the Minister of the Interior, who then issued Royal Patents upon the
awards.' 7 5 Deadlines for taking out awards were extended to 1854,
1862, and then 1895.176
The King, wishing to keep his private domain intact in the event
foreigners conquered the islands, executed, the day after the completion of the Mahele, two documents to stave off foreign appropriation. 1 77 In the first, he gave to the government, for the benefit of the
chiefs and the people, approximately 1.5 million acres out of the
nearly 2.5 million acres that he claimed in the Mahele. 178 In a second
document, the King registered the remaining royal lands for himself,
his heirs, and successors. 179 The lands so registered became known as
Crown Lands, in contradistinction to government lands. 18 0 The Legislature later confirmed these instruments executed by Kamehameha
111.181
170. Id. at 15.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 16. This provision is consistent with the spirit of the second provision only if
tenants cultivated and possessed all of the King's private lands such that the one-third awardable
to them under the fourth provision paralleled the one-third intended under the second provision.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 20-21.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 21-24.
177. Id. at 25.
178. Id. at 25, 31.
179. Id. at 25.
180. Id. at 26.
181. Id.
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The Mahele, then, created three categories of landlords with rights
to allodial titles: The King, the government, and the konohiki. The
Mahele documents, however, did not themselves create unencumbered
fee simple titles. They specifically stated, on the contrary, that each of
the three categories of landlords held "subject to the rights of native
tenants."1' 82 When, after the Mahele, landlords sold their lands, questions arose concerning the meaning of this clause. The Privy Council,
on December 21, 1849, adopted resolutions drafted by Chief Justice
William L. Lee to clarify and protect the "rights of native tenants." 183
The resolutions formed the basis of the Act passed by the Legislature
on August 6, 1850,184 which came to be known as the Kuleana Act.
B.

The Provisionsof the Kuleana Act

The Act, which consisted of seven sections, provided in substance as
185
follows:
1. Fee simple titles, free of commutation, are granted to all native
tenants who occupy and improve any government land, to the extent
of such occupation and improvement, provided the Land Commission
recognizes their claims. Konohiki are not tenants covered under this
Act, and government lands in the towns of Honolulu, Lahaina, and
Hilo are excepted.
2. The above provision applies, in like terms, to tenants who
occupy and improve konohiki and Crown Lands.
3. The Land Commission will award fee simple title in accord
with the above, define and separate the lands of different individuals,
and provide for an equitable exchange of these, where possible, "so
1 86
that each man's land may be by itself."
4. Certain government lands shall be sold in lots of one to fifty
acres to natives not furnished with sufficient land.
5. House lots which are separated from cultivated lands shall not
exceed one-fourth of an acre.
6. In granting cultivated lands, awards shall issue only for lands
really in use, and not for waste lands, or lands cultivated in different
spots to enlarge a lot.
182. Id.at 29.
183. Id.
184. Id. The Land Commission, originally set up in 1845 to investigate and act upon land
claims filed against the government, had its life extended to March 31, 1855, so that it could also
examine and confirm konohiki and maka'ainana claims filed pursuant to the Great Mahele and
the Kuleana Act. Id.at 13.

185. See Appendix for the full text.
186. See Appendix for the full text.
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7. When the landlords have taken allodial titles to their lands, the
people on them may not be deprived of the right to take firewood,
house timber, aho cord, thatch, or ti leaf, but they may not sell such
articles for profit. The people shall inform the landlord or his agent of
their use of the land and proceed with his consent. The people are
entitled to drinking water, running water, and the right of way.
Springs, running water, and roads are free to all, on lands granted in
fee simple, but wells and water courses built by individuals for their
187
own use are excepted.
The maka'ainana ultimately received some 8200 awards on the basis
of the Kuleana Act. 188 Several reasons may account for this low figure.189 First, the two years allotted for registering claims, and the less
than four years for processing them, were hardly realistic given that
the maka'ainana class comprised some 80,000 individuals at the
time. 190 Of these, approximately 29,000 might have been eligible male
claimants.' 9 1 By contrast, the konohiki claimants under the Mahele,
who numbered only 245,192 benefitted from a forty-four year period in
which to secure their awards. 193 Second, the Act failed to reach effectively a population still ill at ease with the written word and suspicious
of the written law. Third, commoners, who had little cash, could not
afford the survey fees which, by contrast, konohiki did not pay because
they received named and therefore already delimited ahupua'a, or subdivisions thereof, called ili. 19 4 Fourth, taking an award might limit the
task of making a living to awarded lots only where formerly traditional subsistence required the exploitation of the whole ahupua'a.
187. Much litigation subsequently centered around this provision. When the Act was
repealed in 1859, this provision was retained and now appears as HAW. REV. STAT. § 7-1 (1976).
It was added to the Act by King Kamehameha III who, in adding it, noted that a "little bit of
land even with allodial title, if they [the people] be cut off from all other privileges would be of
very little value." Kalipi v. Hawaiian Trust Co., 66 Haw. 1, 7, 656 P.2d 745, 749 (quoting Privy
Council Minutes, July 13, 1850 (available in Public Archives of the State of Hawaii)). The King,
with these words, acknowledged, and sought to safeguard, the wide-ranging exploitation of
resources that characterized the traditional economy.
188. See supra note 26 and accompanying text; see also Kelly, supra note 1, at 65.
189. No sufficiently conclusive study of the agrarian turmoil of the time has been published to
date. Such a study could, for example, draw separate profiles for each of the ahupua'a, to see
how many tenants lived in each, how many filed claims, and how many received them. Reliable
patterns of behavior, and the reasons for them, might then emerge. In the meantime, some
scholars have suggested some of the reasons listed here for the low count of awardees. See, e.g.,
Kelly, supra note 1, at 67-69; Linnekin, supra note 48, at 174.
190. An 1850 census counted 80,539 Hawaiians. R. ScHMIr, supra note 25, at 72. One
researcher estimates that around 735 of these were chiefs. Kelly, supra note 1, at 65.
191. Kelly, supra note 1, at 66.
192. Id. at 65.
193. J. CHINEN, supra note 9, at 21-24.
194. See supra note 69.
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Fifth, preferring to live as of old, some tenants assumed that if they
did not act to change anything, the old tenurial system would simply
continue. Finally, some, no doubt, feared that any attempt to file for
kuleana lots within the ahupua'a or ili of the konohiki would invite
reprisal.
IV.

THE CONTEMPLATED DISTRIBUTION OF LAND

The Kuleana Act clearly fell short of transforming the traditional
cultivators of the soil into its modem fee simple owners. How much
land the government intended to secure for the commoners via the
Kuleana Act is not deducible from the Act itself. As stated earlier, the
1846 Principles advocated a division of the kingdom into three equal
parts for the King, the chiefs, and the tenants. When, in 1847, on the
eve of the Mahele, the Privy Council settled on a set of guiding rules
for the division of lands, the persistent formula of one-third each was
again invoked, but with a new ambiguity. The King, the rules read,
should first identify and set aside his domain, of which his tenants
could claim one-third of that which they possessed and cultivated.
Thereafter only, the rules continued, was the remainder of the kingdom to go in absolute one-third parts to three parties: The government, the konohiki, and the tenants. 195
At the Mahele, then, the King took some 2.5 million acres, and left
the chiefs with the remaining 1.5 million acres, which they were to
share in equal one-third portions with the government and the commoners. The King next divided his original share into two parts: one
totalling approximately 1.5 million acres which he gave to the government, and the other 1 million acres which he reserved as Crown Lands
for himself and his heirs.1 96 The chiefs, to obtain awards to their
shares, were required to commute to the government one-third of the
197
value of their lands, in currency or in kind.
Assuming, for purposes of understanding the contemplated distribution of land, that all lands were equal in value, and that the chiefs
would pay the one-third value of their domains to the government in
land, rather than currency, this would have added another 0.5 million
acres to the governmental domain. After the Mahele then, had shares
been divided out as contemplated, the roughly 4 million acres of the
kingdom would have been initially apportioned as follows according to
the Privy Council's own rules:
195. J. CHINEN, supra note 9, at 15-16.
196. Id. at 31.
197. Id at 16.
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1. King's private lands. (still subject to tenants'
claims to one-third of what they possessed or
cultivated thereon):

1.0 million acres.

2. Government lands. Add 1.5 million acres
derived from the King's original share (still
subject to tenants' claims to one-third of what
they possessed or cultivated thereon) to 0.5
million acres commuted by the chiefs:

2.0 million acres.

3. Konohiki or chiefly lands. Subtract from the
original 1.5 million acres the 0.5 million acres
commuted to the government, and the 0.5
million acres owed to tenants:

0.5 million acres.

4. Tenant lands. Counting only the one-third
share of the chiefs' original 1.5 million acres,
since the figure for the tenants' share of onethird of what they possessed or cultivated on the
King's original domain is unknown:

0.5 million acres.

The Privy Council rules, it is clear, treated the King and the chiefs
asymetrically. They allowed tenants on the King's original domain to
claim only one-third of what they actually possessed or cultivated
therein, but permitted them to claim a full one-third share of the
chiefs' lands. Whether this divergence in the prospective application
of the one-third formula was intentional or accidental cannot be
answered here. In any event, the Kuleana Act, enacted three years
after the adoption of the Privy Council rules which guided the Mahele,
did not itself reinvoke the one-third formulation in any version. The
Act simply offered commoners awards to lands, whether kingly,
chiefly, or governmental, wholly commensurate with what they possessed or improved. It has been estimated that Hawaiians, before contact, may have cultivated as little as 1% of the islands' total surface.198
If this is true, then the kuleana awards, which covered some 0.9% of
the kingdom's lands,19 9 and included house lots as well as cultivated
plots, seem to have fallen short of safeguarding even cultivation. On
the other hand, the Hawaiian population in 1850 had been reduced to
one-third its size at Western contact. Presumably, areas under cultivation correspondingly contracted. Whatever the cultivation figure in
1850, however, the area exploited by the commoners, pre- and postcontact, covered a much wider share of the kingdom than 0.9%.
198. M. Kelly, supra note 8, at 3.
199. See Levy, supra note 26, at 856.
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How much land tenants actually possessed or cultivated in the
King's original 2.5 million acres is not known. Consequently, their
reserved one-third portion of such lands remains indeterminable. For
this reason, it is impossible to ascertain how much land the King, the
chiefs, the government, and the commoners would have ultimately
received had the Privy Council rules been fully executed as worded.
However, if the prescription (first enunciated in the Principles, and
later repeated in the Privy Council rules, albeit with new ambiguity)
that a one-thjrd share of the land is to devolve on tenants is presumed
to be the formula intended all along, and if, following court practice in
this matter, the categories of "King" and "government" are collapsed, 2' then a final partition that is consistent with both the Principles and the Privy Council rules may be projected from the initial
Mahele allocation of lands. The three steps below demonstrate that
projection (figures are rounded to the first decimal point):
A.

THE MAHELE STEP.
2.5 million acres

1. The King:
2. The remaining chiefs:

1.5 million acres
Total:

4.0 million acres

B. THE CONVEYANCE/COMMUTATION
TO THE GOVERNMENT STEP.
1. The government. Add King's 1.5 million
acre conveyance (still subject to tenants' onethird share) to the 0.5 million acres commuted
by the ali'i:
2. The chiefs, including the King. Add King's
Crown Lands of 1 million acres (still subject to
tenants' one-third share) to the 1 million acres
held by the ali'i (still subject to tenants' 0.5
million acre share):
Tota 1:

2.0 million acres.
4.0 million acres

C. THE CONVEYANCE TO THE
TENANTS STEP.
1. The government. Add 1 million acres of the
King's conveyance (after 0.5 million acres have
been set aside for tenants) to 0.5 million acres
commuted by the chiefs:

1.5 million acres.

2.0 million acres.

200. The Hawai'i Supreme Court, in discussing land tenure changes under Kamehameha III,
collapsed the landholding categories of King and government. In re Estate of His Majesty
Kamehameha IV, 2 Haw. 715, 719 (1864).
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2. The chiefs, including the King. Add the
King's remaining share of 0.7 million acres (after
0.3 million acres have been set aside for tenants)
to the chiefs' remaining share of 0.5 million
acres (after 0.5 million acres have been set aside
for tenants):
3. Tenants. Add 0.5 million acres from the
chiefs, to 0.3 million acres from the King, to 0.5
million acres from the government:
Total:

Vol. 64:233, 1989

1.2 million acres.

1.3 million acres.
4.0 million acres.

This scheme, had it been realized, would have assigned an approximate one-third share of the kingdom's lands to each of three parties:
The government, 1.5 million acres; the ali'i (chiefs and King), 1.2 million acres; and the tenants, 1.3 million acres. The government of
Kamehameha Il, 1 submit, contemplated this division all along,
because it would have secured the traditional livelihood of the
maka'ainana,which was the stated aim of his government, as early as
1839.
The Kuleana Act itself provides no figures to either support or contradict the above projection. The Act does not, for example, specify
that tenants shall inherit one-third of the kingdom. The Act states,
instead, that tenants on virtually all lands owned by the King, the
government, and the konohiki shall be entitled to fee simple awards of
lots coextensive with lands they either possessed or had improved.
Such lots, when combined with the use rights conferred by the Act in
the resources of the rest of the ahupua'a, would have essentially preserved the traditional land-use patterns of the commoners. The Kuleana Act, in other words, protected, as did the Declaration of Rights,
the Constitution, and the Principles, the traditional livelihood of the
maka'ainana. The Act's silence on the proportions of land that each
party-government, ali'i, and commoners-would finally hold arguably left undisturbed the quantitative formulations laid out in the earlier Principles and Privy Council rules.
The offer of fee simple awards contained in the Kuleana Act, I further submit, represented a device to secure maka'ainana land interests
as much as to separate them out from other interests. Indeed, the Act
may be seen as the Hawai'i government's special effort, however inefficient or unrealistic, to help commoners secure premium taro lands
which, at the time, were probably in special danger of falling into foreign hands. Certainly, the government of Kamehameha III did not
create the fee simple option for the purpose of cutting off the common-
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ers from their sources of livelihood. That livelihood, until the Act,
had consistently been recognized and carefully protected in the Declaration of Rights, the Constitution, and the Princiles of the Land
Commission. The latter additionally recommended that the
maka'ainana receive one-third of the kingdom's lands.
History, admittedly, transformed the Kuleana Act from an instrument for the confirmation of maka'ainana livelihood (which this Article argues it was) into one for its undoing. The Land Commission
handed to maka'ainana fee simple awards to 0.9% of the surface of the
kingdom, a figure in itself not necessarily inconsistent with the estimated percentage of lands traditionally cultivated, 0 1 but wholly out of
keeping with lands traditionally exploited. When the Hawai'i Supreme
Court then tried to limit all commoner land rights to that mere 0.9%,
it was acting in direct contravention of the mandate that the
maka'ainana shall inherit one-third of the lands, and/or be assured a
secure livelihood.
V.

THE INTERPRETATION OF THE KULEANA ACT

Clearly, to limit commoner land rights to 0.9% of the land is to
effect a tragic dispossession of native Hawaiians. Whether the law permits this dispossession and, if not, whether traditional rights can still
be asserted, remain questions of utmost importance. The answers to
these questions lie, respectively, in the legal constraints operating on
the Kuleana Act at its enactment, and in later case law interpreting
the Act.
A.

Legal Constraints Operating on the Kuleana Act

The Kuleana Act was launched into a legal universe inhabited by
the 1839 Declaration of Rights, the 1840 Constitution, and the 1846
Principles of the Land Commission. Being only statutory, the Act
must be read to conform with the Declaration of Rights and the Constitution. As for the Principles,which are also statutory, and of earlier
vintage than the Act, they arguably yield, where inconsistent, to the
Act. The Principles,however, governed the work of the Land Commission, which remained active some five years beyond the passage of
the Kuleana Act.20 2 At the very least, therefore, the Principles,which
stated the government's fundamental laws and policies on land tenure,
will illuminate, where not inconsistent, the terms of the Act.
201. M. Kelly, supra note 8, at 3.
202. J. CHINEN, supra note 9, at 13.

267

Washington Law Review

Vol. 64:233, 1989

The Declaration of Rights guaranteed that the people would not be
dispossessed of their lands except by express provision of law.2 3 The
Kuleana Act, while offering fee simple rights to maka'ainana, contained no language expressly causing the forfeiture of older rights. An
inference of loss, therefore, may not be read into the Act. Under the
protection of the Declaration of Rights alone, then, traditional
maka'ainana rights, where not specifically repudiated, would have survived the passage of the Kuleana Act.
The Declaration of Rights, however, went further. It stipulated that
it was not "proper to enact laws to enrich the chiefs only, without
regard to enriching their subjects also, and hereafter there shall by no
means be any laws enacted which are at variance with what is above
expressed. ' ' 2° Because the Kuleana Act transferred only 0.9% of the
kingdom in fee simple to maka'ainana, the Act could not, without violating the Declaration's prohibition against enrichment laws, simultaneously remove the remaining 99.1% from commoner possession and
use. Consistency with the Declaration therefore additionally required
that the Act either preserve, or else enhance, maka'ainana rights.2 °5
Finally, the 1840 Constitution firmly established the source of those
rights when it pronounced that the land "belonged to the chiefs and
'
people in common. 206
The Principles of the Land Commission, which administered the
Act, also support the view that the Act offered new rights without
thereby compelling the termination of old ones. To begin with, the
Land Commission was required to protect inferior lords and tenants.20 7 Its decisions had to conform to "native usages in regard to
landed tenures ...tenancy and subtenancy. "205 In awarding fee title
under the Kuleana Act, therefore, the Land Commission could neither
reduce nor contravene the customary rights of tenants, especially
when not explicitly commanded to do so by the Act. The customary
203. L. THURSTON, supra note 6, at 1.
204. Id.
205. Were it not for the prohibitions against dispossession and unequal enrichment contained
in the 1839 Declaration of Rights, an argument could be made that maka'ainana cannot
simultaneously hold traditional undivided interests in an ahupua'a and a fee simple title to part
of the same. The "necessary" loss of traditional rights in the ahupua'a is, arguably, incurred, or
compensated for, by the new fee title to a kuleana. The "loss," furthermore, theoretically
occurred with the consent of the maka'ainana, who gave it when he filed for fee title. Note that
no such compensation and consent, however, can be alleged for extinguishing the traditional
rights of maka'ainana who did not file for or receive fee awards.
206. L. THURSTON, supra note 6, at 3.
207. 2 REV. LAWS HAW. 2126 (1925).
208. J. CHINEN, supra note 9, at 9.
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rights of occupants of ahupua'a included not
only the rights of cultiva20 9
access.
and
use,
gathering,
also
tion, but
Sections 6 and 7 of the Kuleana Act jointly safeguarded this traditional complex of rights. According to section 6, fee simple title was
available for "cultivated grounds, or kalo lands" 210 which provided
the primary source of food for maka'ainana households. Section 7, in
turn, specified that the people's gathering rights in the ahupua'a would
continue even "when the landlords have taken allodial titles to their
lands."2" Irrigated kalo, or taro, lands constituted an ahupua'a's most
productive and therefore valuable assets.2 12 It is thus probable that,
after the Great Mahele, they also became the lands most susceptible to
alienation. The Kuleana Act, therefore, offered maka'ainana a modem means-the fee simple title-for securing such lands against alienation by the konohiki. Gathering rights, on the other hand,
constituted a separate privilege. They were not circumscribed by the
act of taking fee title, but endured, instead, throughout the
2 13
ahupua'a.
Furthermore, the Principles,like the Declaration of Rights and the
Constitution, made clear that not even the King, who held the allodium, could "convey away the rights of individuals without their consent."' 21 4 Likewise, when the allodium of certain lands passed from
the King to the konohiki after the Mahele, they too could not "seize
upon the rights of the tenants and dispossess them."2'15 An allodial
title held by a konohiki merely extinguished the "private rights of the
King in the land,, 21 6 not the rights of the tenants.
Although the concept of private property clearly imbues the Kuleana Act, it was not a concept that was adhered to either absolutely, or
exclusively, by the government of Kamehameha III. The Principles
state only that the government wished to conform "in the main" to the
209. See supra Section II. C. (traditional land tenure system).
210. 2 REv. LAWS HAW. 2142 (1925).

211. Id.at 2142.
212. L CHINEN,supra note 9, at 31.

213. This reading of sections 6 and 7 of the Kuleana Act reconciles the direct effect of the
Act-0.9% of all lands were awarded in fee to maka'ainana-with that provision in the
Principles, repeated in the Mahele rules, which stipulated that one-third of the land of the
kingdom should go to the maka'ainana. The goal of the one-third stipulation is roughly realized
after the passage of the Kuleana Act only if three sets of rights are added together: Fee title for
new kuleana awardees, traditional cultivation rights for those not taking out awards, and
traditional gathering rights for both sets of maka'ainana.
214. 2 REv. LAWS HAW. 2136 (1925).
215. Id at 2126.
216. Id. at 2136.
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concept of private property.2 17 For example, the government retained
the right "to enforce the usufruct of lands for the common good,"
even where fee simple titles had issued. 2 18 Finally, both the Principles
and the Kuleana Act show that the government intended that commoners shall have enough land to meet their needs.
To say that the Principles, the Mahele, and the Kuleana Act all contemplated nothing more than the welfare of the maka'ainana would be
to overstate the case. Clearly, the foreign pressure to buy land, coupled with the desire of the ali'i to sell it, brought modern land laws
into being. Nevertheless, the laws reacted against modern pressures as
much as served them. Legal provisions were crafted which, on their
face, protected maka'ainana interests. Only later, when the court got
involved, would maka'ainana rights be whittled away. The process
started early. By the 1850's, Western grantees of konohiki lands were
already bringing suit against commoners for their continued use and
occupancy of ahupua'a land. The resulting decisions, rather than specific statutory language, became the means by which commoners were
dispossessed of their land.
B.

JudicialInterpretationsof the Kuleana Act

2 19

Decided in 1858, Oni v. Meek 2 2 ° stands as the leading case on the
Kuleana Act. There, a maka'ainana brought suit to recover the value
of his two horses taken by the defendant Meek and sold as strays
because they grazed on land leased by Meek from the konohiki of the
ahupua'a in which Oni also resided. Meek held his lands under three
separate leases. The latest lease reserved the "rights of the people living under the shade" of the konohiki.2 2 ' Whether Oni was a kuleana
awardee or not was unclear.2 22
The plaintiff claimed the right to graze his horses on three grounds:
The reservation in the lease, custom, and statute. 223 The court held
217. Id. at 2130. Section 7 of the Kuleana Act clearly shows that the concept of private
property was being adopted only approximatively: "The springs of water, and running water, and
roads shall be free to all, should they need them, on all lands granted in fee-simple .... " Id. at
2142 (emphasis added).
218. Id. at 2128.
219. This section discusses judicial interpretations of traditional rights to resources associated
with occupancy of an ahupua'a. For a discussion of a line of cases presented to the court after
1870, when adverse possession law was used to remove kuleana awardees from their lands, see
Lam, supra note 1, at 115-18.
220. 2 Haw. 87 (1858).
221. Id. at 88.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 88-89.
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against the plaintiff on all grounds. First, it found that Oni had not
224
shown that the horses grazed on lands covered by the reservation;
and that, in any event, whatever rights were reserved to hoaaina,22 5 or
tenants, in the third lease, were rights secured by statutory law, not by
contract.2 26 The reservation in the third lease, in other words, was
superfluous.
Next, the court dismissed the plaintiff's claim under custom after
finding that horse grazing failed to satisfy certain necessary elements
of custom-such as immemorial duration, reasonableness, certainty,
and consistency with the laws.22 7 In addition, the court related, the
hoa'aina of that ahupua'a had met with the konohiki of the place after
1851, and expressed the understanding that the Kuleana Act terminated the old order.228 They had then requested the konohiki to nevertheless accept their old obligations and grant their traditional rights,
anew. 229 The meeting thus marked the end of custom and its replacement with contract. The court further noted that, if the plaintiff was a
kuleana awardee, his fee simple tenure alone would act to terminate
his customary rights. 23 ° By implication, the court allowed that
nonawardees did not lose those rights.
Finally, the Oni court rejected the plaintiff's claim under an 1846
statute that specifically permitted hoa'aina to graze horses in the
ahupua'a. 231 The court found that the Mahele and the Kuleana Act
had separated out interests in lands such that horses and other animals
could no longer graze, with statutory blessing, on konohiki lands, any
more than "cultivation on unoccupied parts" could legally continue.23 2 Section 7 of the Kuleana Act enumerated the only statutorily
protected traditional land tenure rights not implicitly repealed by
224. I. at 88.
225. The court uses the term "hoa'aina," or tenant, rather than "maka'ainana" or commoner,
when talking of non-ali'i on an ahupua'a. For the difference between the two, see supra note 47.
226. On, 2 Haw. at 88-89. In talking about rights secured to hoa'aina by law in 1853, when
the dispute presumably arose, the court asserted that "it was not in the power of the konohiki,
had he been so disposed, to alienate a single right secured by law to the plaintiff." Id. at 89.
227. Id at 90. Concluding that horses had been introduced into the ahupua'a in 1833, the
court sidestepped the issue of whether that was "immemorial." Had the court found that horse
grazing was not immemorial, the argument presumably could still be made that other practices,
such as the free foraging of pigs and fowl, were. See Section II. C. (traditional land tenure
system).
228. On, 2 Haw. at 91.
229. Id
230. Id. at 90.
231. Id at 91-92.

232. Id at 93. By merging grazing and cultivation rights, the court makes light of the
distinction in the traditional Hawaiian economy between raising crops, letting domestic animals
forage, and hunting and gathering wild species.
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post-1846 developments, and that section did not cover horse grazing. 233 The court rounded off its opinion with two significant remarks:
Section 7 rights applied equally to kuleana awardees and nonawardees;
and "people" in section 7 was synonymous with "tenants. '234 "Tenants," a later opinion clarified, included all lawful occupants of an
ahupua'a.2 "
In sum, Oni stands for three propositions. First, notwithstanding
the Declaration of Rights, which permitted dispossession only through
express provision of law, the court will infer the loss of customary
rights in an informal agreement between tenants and konohiki that the
old order had ended. Second, customary rights also ceased upon
acquisition of fee simple title to a kuleana. Third, section 7 of the
Kuleana Act listed the only traditional rights statutorily still available
to kuleana awardees, and to nonawardees who had repudiated the old
order. The court remained silent over the fate of nonawardees who
had not repudiated the old order.
A companion case of the same year, Haalelea v. Montgomery,2 36
adjudicated the fishing rights of konohiki and tenants. This case established important propositions on the nature of rights to resources.
The piscary laws of 1839, as amended in 1846, gave the fishing
grounds from the shoreline of the ahupua'a to the outer edge of the
adjoining reef to the konohiki, as "private property," to hold "for the
equal use of themselves and of the tenants on their respective
lands. ' 23 7 Plaintiff Haalelea, who inherited an ahupua'a from its
konohiki, brought suit to determine fishing rights against defendant
Montgomery, who owned a beach front section of the ahupua'a sold to
him by the konohiki.2 38 Montgomery had prevented the plaintiff and
2 39
other ahupua'a residents from fishing adjacent to his beachfront.
The court confirmed that the kuanalu (beach to reef) grounds
belonged to the konohiki, for his use and the use of ahupua'a tenants. 2 ' The deed to Montgomery did not expressly convey the
konohiki's piscary rights. 241 Those rights, therefore, remained available to their traditional beneficiaries. Their loss may not be inferred
though the konohiki subsequently failed to assert them. Indeed, had
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

272

See Appendix for text of the Kuleana Act.
Oni, 2 Haw. at 87.
See infra note 242.
2 Haw. 62 (1858).
Id. at 65-66.
Id. at 63.
Id. at 64.
Id. at 66.
Id. at 70.
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the deed specified a conveyance of the piscary right, it still would not
have extinguished the tenants' share of that right, which was an ongoing incident of tenancy in the ahupua'a.24 Unlike the tenants, however, the konohiki possessed a piscary right that was a private
ahupua'a, but effective
property right, not incident to residency in the
243
at all times, unless expressly conveyed away.
Haalelea is considerably more enlightened than Oni in at least three
respects. First, it refused to infer the loss of konohiki or tenant rights
from the mere behavior of private parties. Second, it recognized rights
incident to residency in an ahupua'a that were available to all tenants,
awardees or not. Furthermore, these rights related to vast offshore
resources that were not specifically enumerated in section 7 of the
Kuleana Act. Third, it permitted the resources of an ahupua'a to be
claimed under two different but parallel systems of rights: Private
property in the case of the konohiki, and traditional occupancy in the
case of the maka'ainana.
The next major case interpreting the Kuleana Act, Maikai v. A.
Hastings & Co., 4 was decided in 1884. Although only three
paragraphs long, Maikai proves troublesome beyond measure. Kuleana awardees and nonawardees sued the remote lessee of a konohiki
for the waters of a stream needed to irrigate their lands. The lease
from the konohiki reserved two hours of water for the konohiki's taro
patches and "sufficient water for all kuleana rights. '245 The court
held that kuleana awardees rightfully claimed water for their full
needs since the konohiki could not contract away their rights, which
were secured by the Kuleana Act.2 46 The hoa'aina or nonawardees,
however, could only receive as much water as the konohiki gave from
his own reserved two hours.24 7 This opinion, contrary to both Oni and
Haalelea,thus proposed that the Act's section 7 water rights attached
to kuleana awardees alone.24 8 Concurrently, it advanced the novel
proposition that nonawardees enjoyed water rights strictly at the sufferance of the konohiki.2 4 9
242. Id. at 70-71. The term tenant meant any lawful occupant of the ahupua'a, including
former tenants of the konohiki who now occupied kuleana in the ahupua'a. Id. at 71.
243. Id.
244. 5 Haw. 133 (1884).
245. Id. at 134.
246. Id.at 133.
247. Id at 133-34.
248. Although the case does not explicitly refer to § 7 of the Kuleana Act, the context
indicates the section is at issue.
249. The court refers to nonawardees as hoa'aina, whom it describes as "tenants at sufferance
under the konohiki." Maika, 5 Haw. at 133.
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The same Justice,2 5 ° writing eleven years later in Dowsett v.
Maukeala,251' reasserted the notion that nonawardees enjoyed only
such rights to ahupua'a resources as the konohiki granted. Plaintiff
Dowsett, the remote grantee of a konohiki, sought to evict from the
ahupua'a defendant Maukeala, who claimed portions of land through
adverse possession. The court found, as a matter of law, that the
defendant's ancestors, who entered the ahupua'a before the Land
Commission awarded it to the original konohiki, entered permissively,
i.e., without the hostile intent necessary to prove adverse possession.2 52
Unlike Oni, then, this court found that the relationship between
konohiki and maka'ainana had always been contractual, even before
the passage of the Kuleana Act. Because their descendants had not
altered that permissive occupancy by giving notice of hostile intent,
until a recent withholding of rent, the necessary twenty-year period for
adverse possession had not run, and Maukeala could not claim by
adverse possession. 3
The defendant argued that if pre-1850 entry was permissive, the
Kuleana Act thereafter made defendant's presence upon the land hostile. The court countered that nonawardees like the defendant were
presumed to have been "content with their prior status as tenants by
permission of the land owner. Such tenancy would therefore, in law,
be considered as continuing until some act of theirs changed their
holding from the permissive nature to one of an adverse or hostile
nature.

254

The court also rejected the argument that the grant of specific rights
to commoners under section 7 of the Kuleana Act, and under the piscary laws elaborated in Haalelea v. Montgomery,2 55 was inconsistent
with the notion that hoa'aina were tenants at sufferance of the
konohiki. These rights, the court said, applied narrowly only to
"those who have lawful right to reside [on an ahupua'a], whether upon
256
kuleanas or by the will of the owner.,

According to the Dowsett court, then, all Hawaiian commoners
were, from time immemorial until the passage of the Kuleana Act,
tenants at sufferance of the konohiki. Dowsett thereby contradicted
the 1839 Declaration of Rights, the 1840 Constitution, and the Princi250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

Chief Justice Judd was the author of the opinions in both Maikai and Dowsett.
10 Haw. 166 (1895).
Id. at 168.
Id. at 171.
Id. at 169.
2 Haw. 62, 71 (1858).
Dowsett, 10 Haw. at 171.
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pies of the Land Commission of 1846, which all emphasized that the
King, the chiefs, and the commoners held land in common, and that
konohikis in particular held in trust from the King, such that tenants
could not be dispossessed without cause, express provision of law, or
consent.2 5 7 Though Dowsett's characterization of the old order as one
in which commoners enjoyed nothing more than a "permissive" hold
on the land at the sufferance of the konohiki was constitutionally erroneous, 25 8 the case nevertheless advanced this very significant proposition: that commoners not claimingfee simple title under the Kuleana
Act thereby legally availed themselves of the old order.
These four cases established the court's basic approach to the Kuleana Act and to commoner subsistence rights. The cases show that the
court responded more to the economic pressures of the day than to
either doctrinal consistency or the legal duty to protect commoners,
which was spelled out in the 1839 Declaration of Rights, the 1840
Constitution, and the Principles of the Land Commission. The Oni
court, in particular, early contravened the existing legal mandate by
inferring the termination of customary rights on an ahupua'a from little more than an apparent consensus among its konohiki and
maka'ainana that the old order had ended. Given that the presumed
consensus coalesced in the early days of the Kuleana Act, when uncertainty and confusion reigned, it is doubtful that the consensus ever
amounted to an informed consent to terminate custom.
Intriguingly, the same court that decided Oni found, in Haalelea,
that the commoners' traditional right to take fish adjacent to their
ahupua'a had not expired. The old order, it seemed, remained valid as
to fish. The foreigners of the day, of course, pressed hard for land, but
apparently not yet for fish, which may account for the difference
between the two decisions.
Significantly, these early cases, except Maikai, held that section 7
rights applied to kuleana awardees and nonawardees alike. In Maikai,
where a commodity much in demand by white planters (irrigation
water) was at issue, the court instead found that section 7 rights were
limited to awardees.
The recognition in Haaleleaof traditional commoner fishing rights,
which were not enumerated in section 7, showed that traditional rights
flowed through more than the section 7 channel. Oni, of course, found
that horse grazing did not rise to the level of a customary practice. It
257. See supra Section III. A. (discussing pre-1850 land tenure laws).
258. An obvious problem here is that the court is forcing a Hawaiian mode of land tenure
into one of two Western categories which do not suit it: Permissive and hostile.
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also found that a specific event, and not the passage of the Kuleana
Act itself, annulled custom on a particular ahupua'a. Haalelea,
decided the same year, clearly distinguished between private property
and occupancy as bases of rights, and legitimized both. Dowsett,
unfortunately, expanded the Oni and Maikai view, that the Kuleana
Act supplanted customary rights with contractual ones, into the assertion that traditional rights had always been permissive or contractual.
This assertion, as indicated, directly contradicts the language of the
1839 Declaration of Rights, the 1840 Constitution, and the Principles
of the Land Commission. Ironically, however, Dowsett also offered
the proposition, eminently useful to maka'ainana descendants, that
their ancestors who did not claim fee simple title to land are legally
deemed to have opted for the continuation of the old order.
Later cases simply fine tuned, albeit in important respects, the basic
approach of these leading four. Only in December of 1982, when
Kalipi v. Hawaiian Trust 259 was decided, did the court at last, under
the leadership of an outgoing part-Hawaiian Chief Justice, William S.
Richardson, undertake a full reassessment of the status of section 7
rights, as well as other traditional Hawaiian land rights.
The pre-Kalipi fine tuning occurred in fishing and access rights
cases. 260 In Hatton v. Piopio,261 the court considered whether an
ahupua'a land owner could delegate his right to fish to a second party,
and whether that party in turn could sell the fish he caught. The court
decided that mere permission to fish obtained from an owner of land
did not confer fishing rights in the ahupua'a.26 Where the defendant
fisherman lawfully occupied the ahupua'a, however, he could, as an
259. 66 Haw. 1, 656 P.2d 745 (1982).
260. A substantial amount of water rights case law has also developed in Hawai'i. The issues
addressed there concern not only commoner rights, but the nature of the public trust vested in
the government to manage the waters of the state, and how that public trust affects private
property rights. Because of the complexity of the legal domain of water rights and its treatment
as a field somewhat unique in itself, this Article skirts the area even though what happens there
affects, in a very real sense, commoners' rights to the use of the land and its resources. For the
relevant case law, see Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 753 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1985), vacated, 477 U.S. 902
(1986); Territory v. Gay, 31 Haw. 376 (1930), aff'd, 52 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1931), cert. denied,
284 U.S. 677 (1931); Reppun v. Board of Water Supply, 65 Haw. 531, 656 P.2d 57 (1982), cert
denied, 471 U.S. 1014 (1985); McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 55 Haw. 260, 517 P.2d 26 (1973),
cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 417 U.S. 962 (1974); McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 54
Haw. 174, 504 P.2d 1330 (1973); Davis v. Afong, 5 Haw. 216 (1884); Peck v. Bailey, 8 Haw. 658
(1867); see also Chang, Unravelling Robinson v. Ariyoshi: Can Courts "Take" Property?, 2 U.
HAW. L. REV. 57 (1979) [hereinafter Chang, UnravellingRobinson v. Ariyoshi]; Chang, Missing
the Boat: The Ninth Circuit, Hawaiian Water Rights and the Constitutionality of Retroactive

Overruling, 16

GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV.

261. 6 Haw. 334 (1882).
262. Id. at 336.
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incident of occupancy, take fish from the sea.2 63 The court then
decided that while section 7 forbade the taking of ahupua'a resources
for sale, fishing laws, on the other hand, contained no such prohibition. 2 64 The defendant could therefore sell his fish so long as his catch
did not reduce the share of the konohiki.26 5 The court thus reasoned
that a practice was not illegal simply because it was new; under certain
conditions, a sale of today functionally reproduces the permissible barter of yesterday.26 6
In another fishing case, Damon v. Tsutsu 26 7 the court decided that
while a tenant of an ahupua'a could relinquish his fishing rights incident to occupancy, and be estopped from reclaiming them, his relinquishment did not deprive his grantees of those same rights, since the
rights flowed, not from him, but from occupancy of the land. 268 Furthei-more, though an ill or ahupua'a be abandoned by tenants, so that
fishing rights reverted wholly to the konohiki, the same set of rights
remained "subject to open, ' ' 2 11 i.e., claimable by new tenants entering
the ahupua'a.2 7 °
Palama v. Sheehan," an access case, allowed kuleana owners to
enter and exit from their lots through adjoining property provided
alternative access routes were impassable, and that the burden
imposed on the servient estate was not unreasonable. The court held
that this access privilege covered vehicular traffic.2 72 The decision was
based on section 7,273 as well as on the common law doctrine of access
274
by reason of necessity.
In Haiku PlantationsAssociation v. Lono,275 the court considered
whether section 7 alone, in addition to granting ingress and egress,
also permitted a kuleana owner and his guests to park their cars on the
right-of-way through another's land. Hawaiian cases had never inter263. Id.
264. IaMat 336-37.

265. Id at 337.
266. Id The court, in other words, protected the principle behind the custom, and not just its
form, which must be permitted to change with time, or become meaningless.
267. 31 Haw. 678 (1930).
268. Id. at 689-90.
269. Id. at 691.
270. Note, however, that the Organic Act of April 30, 1900, which organized the new
government of the Territory, terminated the exclusive use of the fisheries by ahupua'a occupants.
See L. THURSTON, supra note 6, at 287.
271. 50 Haw. 298, 440 P.2d 95 (1968).
272. Id. at 303, 440 P.2d at 99.

273. Id. at 300, 440 P.2d at 97.
274. Id at 301, 440 P.2d at 98.
275. 1 Haw. App. 263, 618 P.2d 312 (1980).
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preted the right-of-way provision under section 7 to include more than
an easement for ingress and egress.2 76 Assuming, without granting,
that section 7 is "an unrestricted grant of right-of-way whose parame277
ters are determined by evidence of historical and customary usage,
the court concluded that the defendants had historically parked in a
relative's lot, not on the easement, and hence could not claim customary usage.278 The case, by squarely considering whether section 7

could cover cars, and by leaving open the possibility that parking
would be permitted where long established, parallelled the Hatton
holding in which the court countenanced a new practice, the sale of
fish, because it functionally matched an old protected practice, the
barter of fish.
Oddly enough, gathering rights granted by section 7 of the Kuleana
Act did not reach the Supreme Court before Kalipi v. Hawaiian Trust
Co. 279 Plaintiff Kalipi asserted a right to a long-established family
practice of entering defendants' undeveloped lands to gather natural
products used in traditional Hawaiian cultural practices.2 8 ° The plaintiff owned a taro patch in the ahupua'a of Manawai on Moloka'i, and
an adjoining house lot in the neighboring ahupua'a of Ohia. 28 Raised
in these ahupua'a, he resided there until shortly before the trial.28 2
The defendants were the remote grantees of the konohiki of Manawai
and Ohia. The original award for Manawai contained the reservation
that "the kuleanas of the people therein are excepted. '28" The original
award for the relevant eastern portion of Ohia stated: "And we do
hereby declare these lands to be set apart as the lands of the Hawaiian
Government, subject always to the rights of tenants. ' 284 The defendants' lands were largely undeveloped, supporting hunting and grazing
primarily.2 85
The plaintiff claimed gathering rights based on: First, section 7 of
the Kuleana Act; second, custom and tradition as safeguarded since
1892 in Hawaii Revised Statutes; 2 86 and third, the language of the
276. Id. at 266, 618 P.2d at 314.
277. Id.

278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.

Id.
66
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 266-67, 618 P.2d at 314.
Haw. 1, 656 P.2d 745 (1982).
at 3-4, 656 P.2d at 747.
at 3, 656 P.2d at 747.
at 12, 656 P.2d at 752.
at 3, 656 P.2d at 747.

286. HAW. REV. STAT. § 1-1 (1976).
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original awards.28 7 The defendant countered that traditional claims,
as a matter of policy, must be dismissed because they represent "dangerous anachronisms which conflict with and potentially threaten the
concept of fee simple ownership in Hawaii."2
Oniv. Meek,28 9
defendant added, established that all former customary rights now
resided exclusively in section 7 of the Kuleana Act, such that no
independent source of custom could be countenanced.2 9
The court held for the defendant on the ground that the plaintiff,
though he owned land in the ahupua'a, lacked standing to claim gathering rights since he no longer resided there at the time of trial.29 1 The
opinion then offered intriguing interpretations of traditional Hawaiian
rights which, undoubtedly, will be tested in future cases. First, the
court categorically rejected the defendant's policy argument that traditional rights should no longer be entertained. It pointed to the state
constitution, which mandates that "[t]he State reaffirms and shall protect all rights, customarily and traditionally exercised for subsistence,
cultural and religious purposes and possessed by ahupua'a tenants
who are descendants of native Hawaiians who inhabited the Hawaiian
Islands prior to 1778, subject to the right of the State to regulate such
rights."

292

The court then recapitulated the history of Hawaiian land tenure.
The ahupua'a provided Hawaiians with all things necessary for survival.2 93 The use of "undeveloped lands" for subsistence and culture
supported the well-being of both chiefs and commoners.2 9 4 The introduced trading economy, however, placed a value on land "apart from
the labor of those who worked it,"2' 95 leading to the Great Mahele and
the Kuleana Act. The King added section 7 to the Act because he
feared that a "little bit of land even with allodial title, if they [the
people] be cut off from all other privileges would be of very little
6
value.

29

287. Kalipi, 66 Haw. at 4, 656 P.2d at 747.
288. Id.
289. 2 Haw. 87 (1858).
290. Kalipi, 66 Haw. at 9-10, 656 P.2d at 750.
291. Id. at 9, 656 P.2d at 750. The court thus relied on the principle embodied in the holding
of Hatton v. Piopio, 6 Haw. 334, 336 (1882), that tenant fishing rights derive from occupancy,
not ownership.
292. Kalipi v. Hawaiian Trust Co., 66 Haw. 1, 5, 656 P.2d 745, 748 (1982). The quoted
section of HAw. CONST. art. XIL § 7, was added by the 1978 Constitutional Convention, and
adopted by election on November 7, 1978.
293. Kalip 6 Haw. at 6, 656 P.2d at 749.
294. Id. at 6-7, 656 P.2d at 749.
295. Id. at 7, 656 P.2d at 749.
296. Id. (quoting Privy Council Minutes, July 13, 1850).
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The court then reconciled section 7 with the exclusivist nature of
Western land tenure. Section 7, it said, must be interpreted to "assure
that lawful occupants of an ahupua'a may, for the purposes of practicing native Hawaiian customs and traditions, enter undeveloped lands
within the ahupua'a to gather those items enumerated in the statute.
Such activities would, of course, be subject to further governmental
29 7
regulation.
The court itself set certain limits on the gathering right it recognized. The right to gather applied to products only at the moment
that they are reduced to possession.298 It did not entitle an occupant
of an ahupua'a to preemptively prevent its owner from developing the
land, or reducing or destroying its resources.2 99
The court's review of section 7 gathering rights thus in fact spelled
out five limitations. First, as in the past, the rights are restricted to
occupants. 3° Second, items gathered must be for the purpose of practicing Hawaiian custom, 30 1 for section 7 rights "were necessary to
insure the survival of those who, in 1851, sought to live in accordance
with the ancient ways. They thus remain, to the extent provided in the
' 30 2
statute, available to those who wish to continue those ways.
The next three limitations are new. Gathering is prohibited on
developed lands.30 3 To permit it, in the context of current culture,
would "so conflict with understandings of property, and potentially
lead to such disruption, that we could not consider it anything short of
absurd and therefore other than that which was intended by the statute's framers. ' ' 3 ' Gathering on the developed lands of others would
also violate the "traditional Hawaiian way" of "cooperation and non' 30 5
interference with the well-being of other residents.
297. Id. at 7-8, 656 P.2d at 749.
298. Id. at 8 n.2, 656 P. 2d at 749 n.2.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 8, 656 P.2d at 749.
301. Id. at 9, 656 P.2d at 750. As the first gathering rights case, this decision deals not just
with traditional land rights, but with specifically gatherable items. The latter are enumerated in
section 7 of the Kuleana Act. The Kalipi court points out that, while water and access rights
were generally stated in section 7, the language relating to gathering was specific. Id. at 5, 656
P.2d at 748.
302. Id. at 9, 656 P.2d at 750.
303. Id. at 8-9, 656 P.2d at 750.
304. Id. The statement recalls the argument that horse grazing was too unreasonable,
uncertain, and inconsistent with current laws to qualify as permissible custom. Oni v. Meek, 2
Haw. 87, 90 (1858).
305. Kalipi, 66 Haw. at 9, 656 P.2d at 750.
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Next, the court invited the government to regulate section 7
rights.3" 6 Finally, a dictum proposed that the right to gather could
not include the right to restrict the development or diminution of the
ahupua'a and its resources."

The Kalpi court also commented on Hawaii Revised Statutes section 1-1, which establishes traditional Hawaiian usage as a general
source of law.30 The court interpreted the statute to mean that the
rule of custom could prevail over Western common law provided it
30 9
"did not unreasonably interfere with the spirit of the common law.",
Ultimately, however, "the retention of a Hawaiian tradition should in
each case be determined by balancing the respective interests and
harm once it is established that the application of the custom has continued in a particular area."3 10 The court made clear that items not
specifically enumerated in section 7, which nevertheless met the above
test, were gatherable under section 1-1 of Hawaii Revised Statutes.3 1
The most important achievement of the Kalipi court was its careful
review and accurate reinterpretation of Oni v. Meek'31 2 Oni, the court
pointed out, neither ruled out custom as a source of law, nor limited
its applicability to the items enumerated in section 7.313 Horse grazing
had simply failed to meet the test of custom in the particular ahupua'a
implicated in OnL Custom itself, however, remained a source of rights
306. I at 8, 656 P.2d at 749.
307. Id. at 8 n.2, 656 P.2d at 749 n.2.
308. That statute reads:
The common law of England, as ascertained by English and American decisions, is
declared to be the common law of the State of Hawaii in all cases, except as otherwise
expressly provided by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or by the laws of the
State, or fixed by Hawaiian judicial precedent, or established by Hawaiian usage ....

HAW. REV. STAT. § 1-1 (1976).
309. Kalip4 66 Haw. at 10, 656 P.2d at 751. The language of Hawaii Revised Statute § 1-1 in
fact specifically subordinates Anglo-American common law to Hawaiian usage. See supra note
308. No support can be found in the statute for the court's suggestion that the "spirit" of the
English common law somehow prevails over Hawaiian usage. Such preeminence over the federal
Constitution, for example, would be clearly repudiated. Yet the statute lists the Constitution and
Hawaiian usage concurrently. That and the plain language of the statute would seem to give
Hawaiian usage precedence over Anglo-American common law.
310. Kalipi v. Hawaiian Trust Co., 66 Haw. 1, 9, 656 P.2d 745, 750 (1982).
311. Id. The Kuleana Act listed only five items that Hawaiians could gather under statutory
protection. Hawaiians today report that on certain ahupua'a, the listed items have all
disappeared. A native Hawaiian participant at a Hawaiian rights conference in 1983 instead
listed approximately 60 new items now useful and gatherable on a single day on the island of
Moloka'i. See W. Ritte, Summary of Presentation by Walter Ritte to the Native Hawaiian
Rights Conference, May 27-28, 1983 (on file at Washington Law Review).
312. 2 Haw. 87 (1858).
313. Kalip4 66 Haw. at 11-12, 656 P.2d at 751-52.
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where not specifically repudiated.3 14 In a footnote quite discerning of
anthropological reality, the Kalipi court then rejected any intimation
that traditional rights may have all been contractual, or permissive:
The opinion implies that all traditional rights may have been, in
essence, contractual rather than customary insofar as commoners cultivated their lands and enjoyed privileges in exchange for services to the
lord of that ahupuaa. We do not, however, adopt this conclusion. For
we find it difficult to imagine any custom in any ancient culture which
did not exist to in some fashion benefit those who ruled. The relevant
inquiry is therefore not whether those who once ruled continue to benefit, but rather whether the privileges which were permissibly or contractually exercised persisted to the point where it had evolved into an
accepted part of the culture and whether these practices had continued
315
without fundamentally violating the new system.
Finally, the court read Oni to state that section 7 of the Kuleana Act
enumerated all statutorily protected custom, not that all other
unenumerated custom had been extinguished.31 6
In summary, Kalipi concluded that Hawaiian custom remained an
independent source of rights which survived the Kuleana Act, and
which Hawaii Revised Statutes section 1-1 recognizes. The decision
also noted that the State had an obligation, under the Hawaii Constitution, 31 7 to protect these customary rights. Whether in a particular
instance a right prevailed or not would be decided on a case-by-case
basis according to the balancing test set out in Kalipi. The Kuleana
Act, it is clear, conferred special statutory protection for the gathering
rights spelled out in its section 7. Even so, the gathering rights there
were also to be exercised in conformity with parameters laid down in
Kalipi. Whether via custom or section 7, all such rights remained
available only to occupants of the ahupua'a in which the items to be
collected are located.31 8
VI.

CONCLUSION

From Captain Cook's arrival in 1778 until the present, many factors
combined to deprive Hawaiian commoners of their land and its benefits: The forced delivery to foreign ships of food, water, and sandal314. Id.
315. Id. at 11 n.5, 656 P.2d at 751 n.5.
316. Id. at 11-12, 656 P.2d at 751-52.
317. HAW. CONsT. art XII, § 7.
318. Kalipi v. Hawaiian Trust Co., 66 Haw. 13, 9, 656 P.2d 745, 752 (1982). The court did
not elaborate on the third ground for plaintiff's claim-the reservations in the awards-because
it considered the point moot. Id. at 12-13, 656 P.2d at 752.
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wood, which led to the neglect of gardens and waterways; the lure of
work in the towns in exchange for cash and novelty goods; the depletion of manpower through death and disease which rendered untenable a traditional system based on extensive exploitation and exchange
of resources; and the outright conveyance of land to foreigners.
The newcomers' hunger for land pushed the early monarchical government to pass laws which ultimately entitled foreigners,, chiefs, and
commoners alike to hold land in fee simple. In the process, the government remained conscious of its special duty to protect the commoners' traditional means of livelihood. The Declaration of Rights of
1839, the Constitution of 1840, and the Principles of the Land Commission of 1846 enshrined this special duty. The latter also stipulated
that commoners be given one-third of the kingdom in any future division of its lands. The government tried, in the Kuleana Act, to execute its special duty to protect the livelihood of the commoners by
granting them secure cultivation rights, via the fee simple option, as
well as liberal hunting and gathering rights, via traditional ahupua'a
occupancy. The Kuleana Act, then, not only attempted to separate
the tenants' interests in the land from those of the King, the government, and the chiefs-it also tried to preserve their livelihood. Contemporary fishing laws, in addition, secured fishing rights for all
ahupua'a residents. The government of Kamehameha III thus acted,
clearly and repeatedly, to safeguard the commoners' traditional right
to subsist on the land. Admittedly, the mixed legal regime that the
government offered to secure that right did not accomplish its end.
Ultimately, few commoners claimed or received fee simple title to
their gardens and house lots. 31 9 This fact, coupled with the Hawaii
Supreme Court's tendency, until recent times, to read the Kuleana Act
to restrict traditional rights, frustrated the goal of Kamehameha III's
government and its laws. That goal was two-fold: That commoners
would not be dispossessed of their lands or alienated from their traditional livelihood; and that any division of the kingdom would confer
one-third of the lands to the maka'ainana.
Notwithstanding the disappointing judicial record on Hawaiian
land rights, space remains for reconsideration. The supreme court has
never categorically held, for example, that tenants who failed to claim
kuleana awards were thereby deprived of all cultivation rights in an
ahupua'a. In the domain of fishing, from which rights could be analo319. On the last day for filing petitions, fewer than 13,490 claims had been received; of those,
4290 were turned down. Another 1000 probably belonged to chiefs and foreigners. Commoners
received some 8200 awards. Kelly, supra note 1, at 65.
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gized to apply to other kinds of hunting and gathering activities, the
court recognized two alternative sources of rights: Konohiki ownership 320 and occupancy of the ahupua'a. 321' This recognition of ownership and occupancy as dual sources of rights could logically be
extended to cultivation rights as well, especially when case law recognizes that those not claiming kuleana awards in the early 1850's were
presumed to have wanted the old order to continue.3 22 The characterization of the old order as entirely subject to konohiki will was never
accurate, and was rejected in the Kalipi decision.3 23
Case law has also accommodated the evolution of custom, which
permits the application of old rights to new practices. For example,
selling fish as opposed to exchanging them,3 24 and transiting another's
property by car as opposed to going on foot, 325 have both received
customary sanction. The court has further maintained that the occupancy rights to the resources of an abandoned ahupua'a remain available to new or returning occupants.32 6
Finally, the landmark case of Kalipi v. Hawaiian Trust Co. 327 sets
out three clear propositions. First, the present Constitution protects
customary rights, not just for religious practice and cultural ritual, but
for "subsistence. '328 Second, Hawaii Revised Statutes section 1-1
safeguards any customary claim which exhibits historical validity and
meets the interest balancing test.329 Third, section 7 of the Kuleana
Act enumerates only certain specially protected traditional rights, not
all remaining traditional rights.33 °
The time has come to reassess thoroughly the survival of traditional
Hawaiian commoner rights in land. Indeed, the reassessment is overdue. This Article presents elements and issues around which such a
reassessment might be developed. First, the goal of Kamehameha
III's government that commoners shall enjoy a secure livelihood, and
that they shall, in any division of the land, receive one-third of its
surface or value, merits careful consideration. Second, the Kuleana
Act, long seen as an instrument for the dispossession of native
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
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Hawaiians, must be reevaluated, both as to its intent and its implementation-ahupua'a by ahupua'a. Finally, the 1839 Declaration of
Rights, the 1840 Constitution, and the 1846 Principles of the Land
Commission, as well as article XII, section 7 of the present constitution and Hawaii Revised Statutes Section 1-1 (both of which legitimize
Hawaiian custom), need to be studied, as an integrated complex, for
the purpose of synthesizing a legal cosmology of native Hawaiian
rights to guide the decades ahead.
The difficult political question that next arises is whether these
rights, once consolidated, are to be asserted via the judicial or the legislative process. 33 1 Either way the assertion will be difficult, for in
Hawai'i today, as before, the dominant culture dismisses, and the
dominant economy rebuffs, traditional practices. The Hawai'i
Supreme Court, for example, for some 130 years so disregarded the
1840 Constitution's ample protection of traditional Hawaiian rights
that the last Constitutional Convention had to draft an amendment
securing similar protection. 332 The fate which befell the 1840 Constitution could again waylay its successor. The temptation to ignore the
new 1978 Constitutional amendment exists precisely because the language used is strong. The amendment speaks, among other things, of
protecting traditional Hawaiian 'subsistence" rights. 333 Already, in
Kalipi, the defendant urged that traditional rights be set aside because
they were the outdated but still dangerous foe of the dominant fee
simple regime.334
As in the days of Kamehameha I and Captain George Vancouver,
Western culture continues to demand accommodation from native
Hawaiians, while offering little in return. Indeed, the capitalist economy of Hawai'i today, more than ever, exerts pressure for a unified
Anglo-American legal regime that can guarantee it the control, predictability, and stability it needs to realize its large-scale development
ventures. Looking beyond the present economy, however, towards
values more permanent and perhaps more sublime, we confront the
question whether, having devoted considerable resources in the last
five decades to the pursuit of equality under the law, we will now sum331. I am grateful to Professor Duncan Kennedy of Harvard University for alerting me to
19th century case law which deals with the taking issue as it relates to judicial, rather than
legislative, action, and for suggesting that this case law might be fruitfully investigated and
applied to the Hawaiian situation. Unfortunately, time did not permit me to carry out his
suggestion before going to print. But see Chang, Unravelling Robinson v. Ariyoshi, supra note
260, on judicial "taking" in Hawai'i.
332. HAW. CONST. art. XII, § 7.

333. Id.
334. Kalipi v. Hawaiian Trust Co., 66 Haw. 1, 4, 656 P.2d 745, 747 (1982).
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mon the time and energy needed to support diversity as well, and the
difficult legal adjustments that it requires. In Hawai'i, certainly, the
justice owed to native Hawaiians, as well as the goodness available to
us all when we keep open cultural alternatives, beckon us to recognize
and support the Hawaiian people's traditional rights in their land.
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APPENDIX: THE KULEANA ACT
BE ITENACTED by the House of Nobles andRepresentativesof the
Hawaiian Islands, in Legislative Council assembled:
That the following sections which were passed by the King in privy
council on the 21st of December, A.D. 1849, when the legislature was
not in session, be and are hereby confirmed; and that certain other
provisions be inserted, as follows:
1. That fee-simple titles, free of commutation, be and are hereby
granted to all native tenants, who occupy and improve any portion of
any government land, for the lands they so occupy and improve, and
whose claims to said lands shall be recognized as genuine by the land
commission: Provided, however, that this resolution shall not extend
to konohikis or other persons having the care of government lands, or
to the house lots and other lands in which the government have an
interest in the districts of Honolulu, Lahaina and Hilo.
2. By and with the consent of the King and chiefs in privy council
assembled, it is hereby resolved, that fee-simple titles, free of commutation, be and are hereby granted to all native tenants who occupy and
improve any lands other than those mentioned in the preceding resolution, held by the King or any chief or konohiki for the land they so
occupy and improve: Provided, however, that this resolution shall not
extend to house lots or other lands situated in the districts of Honolulu, Lahaina and Hilo.
3. That the board of commissioners to quiet land titles be, and is
hereby empowered to award fee-simple titles in accordance with the
foregoing resolutions; to define and separate the portions of lands
belonging to different individuals; and to provide for an equitable
exchange of such different portions, where it can be done, so that each
man's land may be by itself.
4. That a certain portion of the government lands in each island
shall be set apart, and placed in the hands of special agents, to be
disposed of in lots of from one to fifty acres, in fee-simple, to such
natives as may not be otherwise furnished with sufficient land, at a
minimum price of fifty cents per acre.
5. In granting to the people, their house lots in fee-simple, such as
are separate and distinct from their cultivated lands, the amount of
land in each of said house lots shall not exceed one quarter of an acre.
6. In granting to the people their cultivated grounds, or kalo
lands, they shall only be entitled to what they have really cultivated,
and which lie in the form of cultivated lands; and not such as the
people may have cultivated in different spots, with the seeming inten-
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tion of enlarging their lots; nor shall they be entitled to the waste
lands.
7. When the landlords have taken allodial titles to their lands, the
people on each of their lands, shall not be deprived of the right to take
firewood, house timber, aho cord, thatch, or ti leaf, from the land on
which they live, for their own private use, should they need them, but
they shall not have a right to take such articles to sell for profit. They
shall also inform the landlord or his agent, and proceed with his consent. The people also shall have a right to drinking water, and running
water, and the right of way. The springs of water, and running water,
and roads shall be free to all, should they need them, on all lands
granted in fee-simple: Provided, that this shall not be applicable to
wells and water courses which individuals have made for their own
use.
Done and passed at the council house in Honolulu, this 6th day of
August, A.D. 1850.
KAMEHAMEHA.
KEONI ANA.
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